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08/21/2003
Iraq's Sunnis and Shiites
[We''ll return 9/4]
I thought it was a good time to review some of the basic issues in
Iraq.
First, the religious breakdown.
Shiite Muslims: 60%
Sunni Muslims: 18% (some say 17%, but with all the terrorists
flooding into the country, who knows)
Kurds: 20% (Sunni Muslims, but ethnically distinct from Arabs)
Christians / Minorities: 2%
The new 25-member Iraqi National Council reflects this makeup.
13 Shia Muslims
5 Sunni Muslims
5 Kurds
1 Assyrian Christian
1 Turkmen
*There is also a 9-man rotating presidency; 5 Shiites, 2 Sunnis, 2
Kurds.
The two main distinctive branches of Islam are Sunni and Shia.
Sunni: Traditional orthodox branch of Islam, ‘Ahl as-Sunnah’
(“People of the Path”), followed by 90% of Muslims. Sunnis
accept the “Hadith” (Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) and they
differ from the Shia sect in that they accept the first four caliphs
(religious leaders) as the true successors of Muhammad.
Shia: 2nd-largest branch of Islam. Shiites believe that the true
successor of Muhammad was Ali, whose claim to be Caliph was
not recognized by Sunni Muslims. Shiites reject the Hadith and
rely instead on the pronouncements of a succession of holy men
called Imams. [For ex: In Iran, Ayatollah Khomenei’s Shiite
theocracy stressed the role of Islamic activism in liberation
struggles.]
In Iraq, for the minority Sunnis who ruled under Saddam (as
represented by the Ba’ath Party), today it is a question of
survival. For the majority Shiites, they view post-war Iraq as one
of gains and losses. [The Kurds are basically content, for now.]
If Iraq were to split, for example, the Shiites in the south would
lose Baghdad, despite the fact they are half the population in the
city, plus the oil wells in the north.
As for the Ba’ath (Resurrection) Party, it took control in a 1968
coup, one in which Saddam Hussein played a prominent role.
The party itself was founded in 1943 and was heavily influenced
by both Nazism and Stalinism, with its major objectives being
socialism and Arab unity. Baathists, until the fall of Saddam,
were dominant in both Iraq and Syria, and remain so in the latter.
Saddam took control in 1979 as chairman of the Revolutionary
Command Council and the party put forth the idea that it was a
secular, nationalist government, though dominated by Sunnis.
The Baathists executed senior Shiite Arab clerics and Najaf,
which had been a Shiite center of learning, lost out to Qum in
Iran.
The 1978-79 Iranian Islamic revolution emboldened some of the
Iraqi Shiites, who openly confronted the Baathists, but the
concept of an absolute religious authority in Iraq never took hold
among the majority of them.
During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Iraqi Shiites formed a
majority of the infantry, so there they were, fighting against their
Iranian Shiite brethren. But loyalty was to the state of Iraq, not
the sect, despite inherent discontent with the Sunni-Baathists.
Following Gulf War I, when the United States encouraged revolt,
but then did nothing to back it up militarily, the Shiite uprising in
southern Iraq lacked a prominent religious leader to rally the
forces.
And you saw a similar situation during the past year, when the
Shiites opted not to revolt against Saddam’s rule, which some
would argue helps to underscore the ambivalence by many to the
U.S. presence today. So one of the questions is, as spelled out by
Professor Yitzhak Nakash, can Iraqi Shiites develop a national
identity broad enough to unite the country?
Of more concern to the United States, though, is whether or not
radical Shiites, such as the young cleric Muqtader Sadr, merge
with Sunni Muslims once loyal to Saddam. [Sadr, in his 20s and
viewed as a punk by many Americans military leaders on the
ground, is the son of a top ayatollah murdered by Saddam’s men
in 1999. Sadr City, the slum in Baghdad, is named after him.]
Followers of Muqtader view the Iraqi National Council as
nothing more than an agent of the U.S.
Finally, in reading Middle Eastern scholar Bernard Lewis’s
latest, “The Crisis of Islam,” it’s important to note the parts of
the Hadiths that deal with holy war. Lewis notes a few samples.
“Jihad is your duty under any ruler, be he godly or wicked.”
“A day and a night of fighting on the frontier is better than a
month of fasting and prayer.”
“He who dies without having taken part in a campaign dies in a
kind of unbelief.”
“God marvels at people (those to whom Islam is brought by
conquest) who are dragged to Paradise in chains.”
“Paradise is in the shadow of swords.”
Lewis adds that the traditions also lay down some rules of
warfare for the conduct of jihad:
“Be advised to treat prisoners well.”
“Looting is no more lawful than carrion.”
“God has forbidden the killing of women and children.”
“Muslims are bound by their agreements, provided that these are
lawful.”
And then you have the issue of suicide and Islamic teaching.
Islamic law is very clear on the subject; “It is a major sin and is
punished by eternal damnation ” [Lewis]
The following is from the traditions of the Prophet:
“The Prophet said: Whoever kills himself with a blade will be
tormented with that blade in the fires of Hell.
“The Prophet also said: He who strangles himself will strangle
himself in Hell, and he who stabs himself will stab himself in
Hell He who throws himself off a mountain and kills himself
will thrown himself downward into the fires of Hell He who
drinks poison and kills himself will carry his poison in his hand
and drink it in Hell for ever and ever ”
The troubles we are experiencing today are both infuriating and
frustrating. Will moderate Muslims ever stand up and be
counted, or are we doomed to conflict that ends in a final spasm
of tears?
Sources:
“The Crisis of Islam,” Bernard Lewis
“A History of the Arab Peoples,” Albert Hourani
“The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq,” Yitzhak Nakash [July /
August ‘Foreign Affairs’]
Neil MacFarquhar / New York Times
Alissa Rubin / Los Angeles Times
Hott Spotts will return on September 4.
Brian Trumbore
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