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11/06/2003

China's Military, Part II

Continuing with excerpts from the U.S. Department of Defense’s
annual report to Congress on the current and future military
strategy of the People’s Republic of China.

---

While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with
Washington – primarily in terms of trade and technology –
Beijing apparently believes that the United States poses a
significant long-term challenge. China’s leaders have asserted
that the United States seeks to maintain a dominant geostrategic
position by containing the growth of Chinese power, ultimately
“dividing” and “Westernizing” China, and preventing a
resurgence of Russian power. Beijing has interpreted the
strengthened U.S.-Japan security alliance, increased U.S.
presence in the Asia-Pacific region – including Central Asia –
and efforts to expand NATO as manifestations of Washington’s
strategy.

Beijing probably assesses that U.S. efforts to develop missile
defenses will challenge the credibility of China’s nuclear
deterrent and eventually be extended to protect Taiwan. In
Beijing’s view, this development would degrade the coercive
value of its growing conventional ballistic-missile capability
opposite the island and constitute a de facto military alliance
between Washington and Taipei. Beijing continues to voice
opposition to missile defense, as well as concern regarding U.S.
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It also argues
against Taiwan’s inclusion in a missile defense system, albeit
less stridently than in previous years.

Chinese analyses indicate a concern that Beijing would have
difficulty in managing potential U.S. military intervention in
crises in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. Past Chinese
concerns that the United States might intervene in internal
disputes with ethnic Tibetan or Muslim minorities – in part
reinforced by their perceptions of the U.S. response to the 1995-
96 Taiwan Strait crises, Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo,
and, more recently, U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq – probably have been tempered by Beijing’s recognition
that unlike Kosovo, China is a nuclear power, which lowers the
probability of a U.S. attack on Chinese territory.

While these concerns and longstanding assessments of the
international security environment have not changed
fundamentally in recent years, a leadership consensus appeared
to emerge from the 16th Party Congress that Beijing can best
advance its interests by projecting a positive, cooperative image
to the international community and to the United States, in
particular. Indications of a shift in Beijing’s approach became
apparent during 2002 and early 2003 when Beijing increased its
contacts with NATO, played an active role in the Iraq issue and
voted for Resolution 1441 and 1483 in the UN Security Council,
and responded moderately to U.S.-Taiwan defense ties, missile
defense, and a number of other contentious issues in Sino-
American relations.

--

Beyond its more traditional security concerns, China’s strategic
planners are beginning to recognize global and transnational
threats such as HIV / AIDS, environmental degradation,
international crime and narcotics trafficking, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .

While stressing the primacy of economic power, Beijing views
the military as necessary to ensure that China’s economic power
will rise, to protect important national interests, and to support
China’s eventual emergence as a great power and the preeminent
power in Asia. Nevertheless, China’s leaders starting with Deng
Xiaoping have placed military modernization behind other
priorities such as development in agriculture, industry, and
science and technology. This placement is based on a calculation
that broad-based modernization will raise overall levels of
industry, technology, and human resources to sustain long-term
military modernization.

--

A key variable in assessing long-term trends in the PRC’s
security strategy is Taiwan. One of Beijing’s priority security
interests is to prevent further steps by Taiwan toward permanent
separation from the mainland and to secure the eventual
resolution of the Taiwan issue on China’s terms. Taiwan’s
integration under mainland authority is considered to be an
essential step toward completion of national reunification. Over
the last year, Beijing has adopted a more moderate public
approach toward Taiwan, in large part because it sees little
opportunity to press its case until Taiwan’s next presidential
election in March 2004. Nonetheless, Beijing remains inflexible
in its fundamental principle of agreeing to cross-Strait dialogue
only under the conditions of a “one China, two systems”
framework.

Beijing seeks national unification to satisfy cultural and
nationalist sentiment, but also to address perceived political and
security interests. Beijing assesses that the permanent separation
of Taiwan from the mainland could serve as a strategic foothold
for the United States. Conversely, securing control over Taiwan
would allow China to move its defensive perimeter further
seaward. China’s Taiwan strategy will continue to emphasize a
coercive approach toward Taipei and Beijing’s decision-makers
have affirmed that they will resort to force if Taiwan’s present de
facto separation becomes official, either through a declaration or
international recognition as such. Moreover, China’s leaders
have threatened force if they fail to make progress toward
“reunification” objectives. Despite the omission of this threat in
the 2002 Defense White Paper, the 16th Party Congress report
asserts that “the Taiwan issue must not be allowed to stall
indefinitely.”

In addition to preventing Taipei’s moves toward de jure
independence, Beijing seeks to counter what it perceives to be
Japan’s growing military cooperation, with the United States and
to prevent a rebirth of Japanese “militarism.” At the same time,
it continues to value the economic benefits it derives from access
to Japanese technology, trade, and foreign investment. Beijing’s
other important security goals in East Asia include preventing the
development and implementation of a regional theater missile
defense system, particularly one involving Taiwan; coping with
challenges to its claims in the East and South China Seas; and
supporting its economic interests through bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, such as ASEAN (and APEC)

The United States will remain central to these regional priorities.
Consequently, China’s actions in the region will be shaped by its
assessment of U.S. policies, particularly Washington’s regional
alliance and defense relationships. While seeking a stable
relationship with Washington, Beijing will continue to seek
opportunities to diminish U.S. regional influence.

--

China’s more forward-looking strategists note the 1991 Gulf
War’s role in bringing the emerging Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) into sharp focus for the PLA. In particular, PLA
observers witnessed how quickly the force, equipped with high-
tech weapons systems, defeated the Iraqi force that resembled the
PLA in many ways. The force and capability displayed by the
coalition during that conflict prompted PLA theorists to alter
their perceptions of the character of future wars, highlighting the
role of air and air defense operations, electronic and information
warfare, and long-range precision strikes.

--The PLA believes that surprise is crucial for the success of any
military campaign, and it likely would not be willing to initiate
any military action unless assured of a significant degree of
strategic surprise. With no apparent political prohibitions against
preemption, the PLA requires shock as a force multiplier, to
catch Taiwan, or another potential adversary such as the United
States, unprepared. (China’s military chief of staff has) noted
that without adopting a preemptive doctrine, the chances of a
PLA victory are limited.

--

Summary

Beijing is pursuing its long-term political goals of developing its
comprehensive national power and ensuring a favorable
“strategic configuration of power.” China’s efforts to
accomplish its security goals involve an integrated strategy that
seeks to apply diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
instruments of national power. China’s leaders believe that
national unity and stability are critical if China is to survive and
develop as a nation. Chinese leaders also believe they must
maintain conditions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with the
United States – primarily in terms of trade and technology –
Beijing apparently believes that the United States poses a
significant long-term challenge .

Preparing for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait is the
primary driver for China’s military modernization .Should
China use force against Taiwan, its primary goal likely would be
to compel a quick negotiated solution on terms favorable to
Beijing.

---

Hott Spots will return 11/13. Thoughts on Russia’s Yukos crisis
and Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Brian Trumbore


AddThis Feed Button

 

-11/06/2003-      
Web Epoch NJ Web Design  |  (c) Copyright 2016 StocksandNews.com, LLC.

Hot Spots

11/06/2003

China's Military, Part II

Continuing with excerpts from the U.S. Department of Defense’s
annual report to Congress on the current and future military
strategy of the People’s Republic of China.

---

While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with
Washington – primarily in terms of trade and technology –
Beijing apparently believes that the United States poses a
significant long-term challenge. China’s leaders have asserted
that the United States seeks to maintain a dominant geostrategic
position by containing the growth of Chinese power, ultimately
“dividing” and “Westernizing” China, and preventing a
resurgence of Russian power. Beijing has interpreted the
strengthened U.S.-Japan security alliance, increased U.S.
presence in the Asia-Pacific region – including Central Asia –
and efforts to expand NATO as manifestations of Washington’s
strategy.

Beijing probably assesses that U.S. efforts to develop missile
defenses will challenge the credibility of China’s nuclear
deterrent and eventually be extended to protect Taiwan. In
Beijing’s view, this development would degrade the coercive
value of its growing conventional ballistic-missile capability
opposite the island and constitute a de facto military alliance
between Washington and Taipei. Beijing continues to voice
opposition to missile defense, as well as concern regarding U.S.
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It also argues
against Taiwan’s inclusion in a missile defense system, albeit
less stridently than in previous years.

Chinese analyses indicate a concern that Beijing would have
difficulty in managing potential U.S. military intervention in
crises in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. Past Chinese
concerns that the United States might intervene in internal
disputes with ethnic Tibetan or Muslim minorities – in part
reinforced by their perceptions of the U.S. response to the 1995-
96 Taiwan Strait crises, Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo,
and, more recently, U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq – probably have been tempered by Beijing’s recognition
that unlike Kosovo, China is a nuclear power, which lowers the
probability of a U.S. attack on Chinese territory.

While these concerns and longstanding assessments of the
international security environment have not changed
fundamentally in recent years, a leadership consensus appeared
to emerge from the 16th Party Congress that Beijing can best
advance its interests by projecting a positive, cooperative image
to the international community and to the United States, in
particular. Indications of a shift in Beijing’s approach became
apparent during 2002 and early 2003 when Beijing increased its
contacts with NATO, played an active role in the Iraq issue and
voted for Resolution 1441 and 1483 in the UN Security Council,
and responded moderately to U.S.-Taiwan defense ties, missile
defense, and a number of other contentious issues in Sino-
American relations.

--

Beyond its more traditional security concerns, China’s strategic
planners are beginning to recognize global and transnational
threats such as HIV / AIDS, environmental degradation,
international crime and narcotics trafficking, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .

While stressing the primacy of economic power, Beijing views
the military as necessary to ensure that China’s economic power
will rise, to protect important national interests, and to support
China’s eventual emergence as a great power and the preeminent
power in Asia. Nevertheless, China’s leaders starting with Deng
Xiaoping have placed military modernization behind other
priorities such as development in agriculture, industry, and
science and technology. This placement is based on a calculation
that broad-based modernization will raise overall levels of
industry, technology, and human resources to sustain long-term
military modernization.

--

A key variable in assessing long-term trends in the PRC’s
security strategy is Taiwan. One of Beijing’s priority security
interests is to prevent further steps by Taiwan toward permanent
separation from the mainland and to secure the eventual
resolution of the Taiwan issue on China’s terms. Taiwan’s
integration under mainland authority is considered to be an
essential step toward completion of national reunification. Over
the last year, Beijing has adopted a more moderate public
approach toward Taiwan, in large part because it sees little
opportunity to press its case until Taiwan’s next presidential
election in March 2004. Nonetheless, Beijing remains inflexible
in its fundamental principle of agreeing to cross-Strait dialogue
only under the conditions of a “one China, two systems”
framework.

Beijing seeks national unification to satisfy cultural and
nationalist sentiment, but also to address perceived political and
security interests. Beijing assesses that the permanent separation
of Taiwan from the mainland could serve as a strategic foothold
for the United States. Conversely, securing control over Taiwan
would allow China to move its defensive perimeter further
seaward. China’s Taiwan strategy will continue to emphasize a
coercive approach toward Taipei and Beijing’s decision-makers
have affirmed that they will resort to force if Taiwan’s present de
facto separation becomes official, either through a declaration or
international recognition as such. Moreover, China’s leaders
have threatened force if they fail to make progress toward
“reunification” objectives. Despite the omission of this threat in
the 2002 Defense White Paper, the 16th Party Congress report
asserts that “the Taiwan issue must not be allowed to stall
indefinitely.”

In addition to preventing Taipei’s moves toward de jure
independence, Beijing seeks to counter what it perceives to be
Japan’s growing military cooperation, with the United States and
to prevent a rebirth of Japanese “militarism.” At the same time,
it continues to value the economic benefits it derives from access
to Japanese technology, trade, and foreign investment. Beijing’s
other important security goals in East Asia include preventing the
development and implementation of a regional theater missile
defense system, particularly one involving Taiwan; coping with
challenges to its claims in the East and South China Seas; and
supporting its economic interests through bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, such as ASEAN (and APEC)

The United States will remain central to these regional priorities.
Consequently, China’s actions in the region will be shaped by its
assessment of U.S. policies, particularly Washington’s regional
alliance and defense relationships. While seeking a stable
relationship with Washington, Beijing will continue to seek
opportunities to diminish U.S. regional influence.

--

China’s more forward-looking strategists note the 1991 Gulf
War’s role in bringing the emerging Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) into sharp focus for the PLA. In particular, PLA
observers witnessed how quickly the force, equipped with high-
tech weapons systems, defeated the Iraqi force that resembled the
PLA in many ways. The force and capability displayed by the
coalition during that conflict prompted PLA theorists to alter
their perceptions of the character of future wars, highlighting the
role of air and air defense operations, electronic and information
warfare, and long-range precision strikes.

--The PLA believes that surprise is crucial for the success of any
military campaign, and it likely would not be willing to initiate
any military action unless assured of a significant degree of
strategic surprise. With no apparent political prohibitions against
preemption, the PLA requires shock as a force multiplier, to
catch Taiwan, or another potential adversary such as the United
States, unprepared. (China’s military chief of staff has) noted
that without adopting a preemptive doctrine, the chances of a
PLA victory are limited.

--

Summary

Beijing is pursuing its long-term political goals of developing its
comprehensive national power and ensuring a favorable
“strategic configuration of power.” China’s efforts to
accomplish its security goals involve an integrated strategy that
seeks to apply diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
instruments of national power. China’s leaders believe that
national unity and stability are critical if China is to survive and
develop as a nation. Chinese leaders also believe they must
maintain conditions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with the
United States – primarily in terms of trade and technology –
Beijing apparently believes that the United States poses a
significant long-term challenge .

Preparing for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait is the
primary driver for China’s military modernization .Should
China use force against Taiwan, its primary goal likely would be
to compel a quick negotiated solution on terms favorable to
Beijing.

---

Hott Spots will return 11/13. Thoughts on Russia’s Yukos crisis
and Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Brian Trumbore