03/18/2004
March / April 2003
PBS’ “Frontline” program recently had a superb narrative of the initial days of the Iraq War.
Operation Iraqi Freedom a look back
Spring 2003
March 6 President Bush announces that time is running out on the UN inspections process and on Saddam Hussein.
March 17 Bush delivers final ultimatum: “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to go will result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.”
March 19 The coalition plans to begin the invasion with a spectacular opening “decapitation” strike, targeting the top 55 men in the Iraqi leadership. But then there is a sudden change of plans, as CIA Director George Tenet has received a tip on where Saddam would be that evening. A surprise strike against Saddam is authorized instead of the original plan of attack. The U.S. hits the Dora Farm complex where Saddam and members of the family are supposed to be, but he’s not there.
March 20 Invasion begins. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is upbeat. “There will be Iraqis who offer not only to help us but to help liberate the country and to free the Iraqi people. More of them there are, the greater the chance that the war will be limited and less broad.”
March 21 The coalition launches its bombing campaign in Baghdad. “Shock and awe” is designed to convince the Iraqi people that it is safe to overthrow the regime.
American commanders advancing across the Kuwait border report Iraqi regular forces are simply falling apart, taking off uniforms and disappearing among the civilian population.
British reach outskirts of Basra but are met with resistance from regular troops and Fedayeen.
March 22 The forward elements of the 3rd infantry are roughly halfway to Baghdad.
March 23 U.S. forces meet with resistance around Nasiriya. 11 Americans die, 7 are taken prisoner, when Fedayeen attacks maintenance unit. In a separate attack, 18 Marines die in the same region. With the toll of 29 that day, hopes fade that Iraqi people will help coalition overthrow Saddam.
March 25 Due largely to a fierce sandstorm, the advance on Baghdad stalls. Back in Washington, armchair generals begin complaining there aren’t enough troops in the theatre.
April 2...Members of the 3rd infantry advance into the vital Karbala Gap and the chemical attack they fear doesn’t materialize.
April 3-4 Troops from 3rd I-D reach Saddam International Airport. Not quite ready for final assault on Baghdad, fearing the remnants of the Republican Guard, but it turns out key Guard units are positioned south of Baghdad. Americans had bypassed them and didn’t know it. The Guard is dealt with as the Iraqis are caught by surprise and have their tanks pointed the wrong way. The feared Medina Division melts away.
April 5 Back in Basra, British are tightening the noose around the city. Acting on an intelligence tip, F-16s go after “Chemical Ali,” but the strike misses him. Nonetheless, it’s a turning point because citizens of Basra believe he is dead.
April 7 Marines storm eastern boundary of Baghdad. Then Col. Perkins “Thunder Run” heads straight downtown, meeting the only real resistance. 19 days after crossing the Kuwait border, the Americans have penetrated to the heart of the regime.
That same afternoon the Americans get another intelligence tip on Saddam; he is in the Al Mansour district in the west of Baghdad. Intelligence is off again. 18 civilians are killed.
April 9 Statue of Saddam is pulled down. As American columns continue to roll into Baghdad, there are few of the triumphal scenes the coalition hoped for. Looting spreads quickly.
April 11 Secretary Rumsfeld comments on the looting, saying “freedom’s untidy and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things ”
May 1 President Bush lands on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln and announces the official end of combat operations in Iraq. But the insurgency begins to grow.
Less than 150 American troops died in the allied invasion. Over 400 have perished since May 1.
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Interviews with key American leaders What happened?
Secretary of the Army Thomas White (5/01-5/03)
Q: What was the mood in the Pentagon and their expectation of what was likely to happen once troops actually crossed the border into Iraq?
White: I think the expectation was that there would be mass surrenders; that the combat phase of the operation would not be too difficult; that, at grassroots level, this would be viewed as a war of liberation .
The view on the military side, I think, was far more pessimistic. We were very concerned that there wouldn’t be sufficient boots on the ground after the operation to provide for security and get on with the stabilization activities.
Q: Paul Wolfowitz, also Donald Rumsfeld, were very outspoken in criticizing the army’s views on troop levels needed.
White: There’s a certain amount of arrogance to both of them in this regard
Our view was that they were going to be terribly wrong .I mean, here you have a population which is fractured, with the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shias. It’s a huge country. It’s been ruled with an iron fist by a tyrant. As soon as you take that iron fist off the population and don’t replace it with an obvious presence of law and order, I don’t think it was that hard to divine what was going to occur.
Q: [What was your view of the events following the toppling of Saddam’s statue and the looting that ensued?]
White: To a degree, the infrastructure of the country was effectively dismantled before our very eyes on CNN. It really crystallizes the completely ineffective view of what would be required in postwar Iraq. It set the tone.
Q: What were the key lessons learned from this war, for you?
White: In the world that we face, the combat phase may be the easiest part; B, that what follows the combat phase is where most of the strategic objectives will be achieved or not achieved and, therefore, it deserves as much planning and attention as the combat phase does. Three, until you’ve done that, don’t start the operation in the first place. Fourth, it’s going to take you a long time and a great deal of effort if you get into anything the scale that we’ve gotten into in Iraq. So you’d better be ready for it.
Q: Are you personally angry about the way the postwar’s been mishandled?
White: I think we should all be angry.
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Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of combined allied land forces.
Q: The troops level you had – was it something that you and all of your senior field commanders were totally happy with?
McKiernan: [You never get everything you want.] But I will tell you unequivocally that the force I had as the ground component commander were the forces that I asked for and were sufficient to do the mission that I was given
[McKiernan complained about the force ‘flow,’ however.]
The transition from major combat operations to subsequent combat operations and stability and support operations was so fast, and you had no Iraq institutions to (bring) into this (process). No Iraqi army, no Iraqi police. The prisoners (were) let out of prison. No local or national government organization. Ministries didn’t exist. So into that power vacuum, (having) some of these later-flowing capabilities (quicker) would have been (helpful).
Q: As a general trying to organize the practical campaign in the field, how useful, comprehensive, and specific was the intelligence that you had?
McKiernan: We had superb electronic intelligence. We knew the terrain, we had absolutely first-rate terrain products. What we didn’t have (enough) of was human intelligence. And you don’t just develop human intelligence overnight That requires assets that work over long lead times. So we (had) a deficit (of) human intelligence (in) Iraq
Q: Did the generals win the war and the politicians lose the peace?
McKiernan: Soldiers and small units won decisive combat operations and removed the Baath and regime. Nobody has lost the war. The campaign continues. The war had changed dramatically in nature and we’re into what I call the back end of the campaign, which is a combination of combat actions, of security and stability operations, of peacekeeping operations, of infrastructure repair, of transition to the Iraqi leadership and ministries and governance. Nobody has lost that war.
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Lt. Gen. William Scott Wallace, commander of U.S. Army’s 5th Corps.
Q: When did your planning for this conflict actually begin?
Wallace: Our planning in the 5th Corps actually started in November of 2001 when we were given direction to start looking at the possibility of operations in Iraq.
Q: General Franks was happy with the troop levels Were you?
Wallace: I guess that, as summer (2002) arrived, I wasn’t real comfortable with the troop levels.
Q: What are your memories of the period of the sandstorms?
Wallace: The weather really sucked. It’s hard to describe You could literally not see more than about 30 or 40 feet with your naked eye. The whole area was engulfed by this orangish, reddish haze – it looks like one of these old science fiction movies of folks walking around the surface of Mars. I mean, there’s just red haze, and then it started raining. And because of all the particles suspended in the air, as the rain hit the ground it was actually a drop of mud, and it began to cake on the vehicles.
Q: The military did their job. They won the war in three weeks. In the postwar, have the politicians mishandled it?
Wallace: The military did their job in three weeks. I give no credit to the politicians for detailed Phase Four (the reconstruction of Iraq) planning. But I don’t think that we, the military, did a very good job of anticipating (that) either. I don’t think that any of us either could have or did anticipate the total collapse of this regime and the psychological impact it had on the entire nation. When we arrived in Baghdad, everybody had gone home The regime officials were gone; the folks that provided security of the ministry buildings had gone; the folks that operated the water treatment plants and the electricity grid and the water purification plants were gone. There were no bus drivers, no taxi drivers; everybody just went home.
I for one did not anticipate our presence being such a traumatic influence on the entire population. We expected there to be some degree of infrastructure left in the city, in terms of intellectual infrastructure, in terms of running the city infrastructure, in terms of running the government infrastructure. But what in fact happened, which was unanticipated at least in my mind, is that when we decapitated the regime, everything below it fell apart. I’m not sure that we could have anticipated that.
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[Source: pbs.org]
Hott Spotts returns March 25.
Brian Trumbore
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