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12/09/2004
Iran's Weapons Capabilities
Each year the Director of Central Intelligence is required by
Congress to submit a report on those nations bent on acquiring or
developing production of weapons of mass destruction (including
nuclear, chemical and biological). Following is the recent
submission of unclassified material to Congress regarding the
activities of Iran. While the information is for the period 7/1/03-
12/31/03, it is still very much applicable to today.
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Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to
produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Iran is also
working to improve delivery systems as well as advanced
conventional weapons (ACW). To this end, Iran continued to
seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how.
During the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on
entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe. Iran’s
nuclear program received significant assistance in the past from
the proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q.
Khan.
Nuclear: The United States remains convinced that Tehran has
been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in
contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT). During 2003, Iran continued to
pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian
purposes but with clear weapons potential. International scrutiny
and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections
and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using
facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program
as long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT. However, Iran
could use the same technology at other, covert locations for
military applications.
Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy program to
justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire
the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this fuel cycle
would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, such
as the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor that Russia is
continuing to build at the southern port city of Bushehr.
However, Iran does not need to produce its own fuel for this
reactor because Russia has pledged to provide the fuel
throughout the operating lifetime of the reactor and is negotiating
with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel. An Iranian
opposition group, beginning in August of 2002, revealed several
previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities, sparking
numerous IAEA inspections since February 2003. Subsequent
reports by the IAEA Director General revealed numerous failures
by Iran to disclose facilities and activities, which run contrary to
its IAEA safeguards obligations. Before the reporting period, the
A.Q. Khan network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan’s
older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and
efficient models, and components.
The November 2003 report of the IAEA Director General (DG)
to the Board of Governors describes a pattern of Iranian
safeguards breaches, including the failure to: report the import
and chemical conversion of uranium compounds, report the
separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium targets, report
the enrichment of uranium using both centrifuges and lasers, and
provide design information for numerous fuel cycle facilities. In
October 2003, Iran sent a report to the DG providing additional
detail on its nuclear program and signed an agreement with the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany that included an Iranian
promise to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing efforts. On
18 December 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to
its IAEA Safeguards Agreement but took no steps to ratify the
Protocol during this reporting period.
Ballistic Missile: Ballistic missile-related cooperation from
entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over
the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-
sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance
during 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and
expertise. Iran’s ballistic missile inventory is among the largest
in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) – including the Shahab-1
(Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud-C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8) – as well
as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already producing Scud
SRBMs, Iran announced that it had begun production of the
Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-
110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of
follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that
another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic
missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a
space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is also
pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical: Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to
seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign
entities that could further Tehran’s efforts to achieve an
indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran may have
already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve
agents – and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them –
which it previously had manufactured.
Biological: Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive
BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical
materials, equipment, and expertise that could be used in
Tehran’s BW program. Iran probably has the capability to
produce at least small quantities of BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons: Iran continued to seek and
acquire conventional weapons and production technologies,
primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also
sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components
and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire
through normal governmental channels.
Source: cia.gov
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Hott Spotts will return December 16.
Brian Trumbore
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