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06/07/2007
Well Under Control
Back on 4/19/07 in this space I wrote of how the terror threat in
the Strait of Malacca, the body of water that bisects Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia, was overrated, particularly in terms of
non-existent links between terrorists and the more traditional
pirates that ply the waters in the area.
So I read with interest a story on Monday from Agence France-
Presse that Indonesia’s defense minister was calling on Japan,
China and South Korea to help his cash-strapped nation secure
the Strait. Again, I don’t think the threat, as we once feared,
truly exists.
Then I read an essay in the May/June 2007 issue of Foreign
Affairs by Dennis Blair, former Commander in Chief of U.S.
Pacific Command, and Kenneth Lieberthal, Professor of Political
Science at the University of Michigan who also served on the
National Security Council, which reiterates the world’s shipping
lanes are safe.
First some facts.
Yes, the United States imports 60 percent of its oil, over 95
percent of which arrives by sea. Yes, Japan receives virtually all
of its oil by maritime transport. Yes, China is importing 50
percent or so these days, India 70 percent, and for both, 90
percent of it by sea.
And, yes, 25 percent of total global oil shipments slice through
the 21-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, which leads out of the
Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean. Much of this oil bound for
China, Japan, and the West Coast of the United States from the
Middle East must also transit the Strait of Malacca.
But, as Blair and Lieberthal write, “in reality the risks to
maritime flows of oil are far smaller than is commonly assumed.
First, tankers are much less vulnerable than conventional wisdom
holds. Second, limited regional conflicts would be unlikely to
seriously upset traffic Third, only a naval power of the United
States’ strength could seriously disrupt oil shipments, but the
United States is more likely to protect shipping on the high seas
than to do anything to endanger it. Fourth, if any country
attempted to interfere with international shipping, a coalition
would inevitably form to keep traffic flowing with manageable
damage to oil deliveries and the global economy.”
What it boils down to is attacking commercial ships has only
been effective when employed by major powers such as U.S.
operations against Japan during World War II, or German
operations against Allied shipping in the Atlantic during both
world wars. Lesser naval powers simply don’t have the
resources to carry it off.
Blair and Lieberthal cite the instructive example of the Iran-Iraq
War, during which the two sides attacked each others interests
with little real success. Commercial shipping in the Gulf initially
declined 25 percent, but then the United States and others offered
protection for neutral states and the tanker war ended up
impacting about 2 percent of the traffic passing through the Strait
of Hormuz.
And the size and strength of the global tanker fleet has increased
considerably since 1980. For starters, single-hulled tankers are
being phased out in favor of double-hulled ones. Conventional
warheads are also far less effective against large modern tankers.
Mines have little impact, thanks in no small part to “the
protective effect of the liquid petroleum they carried (petroleum
is not explosive in the airless tanks, and its weight holds the hulls
in place).” [An important principle when discussing the JFK
terror plot, designed to hit the pipelines.] Warheads that land on
a tanker deck also do little damage.
As for Iran today, yes, it could disrupt traffic for a spell by the
use of Chinese Silkworm missiles and patrol boats, as well as
high-speed boats packed with explosives to ram oil tankers. But
to do so then interferes in the shipping of neutral nations and
soon you’d have a coalition of those with an interest to keep the
free flow of oil. Let’s face it as I’ve written in my “Week in
Review” column, this is one fear in the marketplace today that is
greatly overrated. Terror groups could achieve little more in this
realm as well.
But Blair and Lieberthal, while correctly adding “the U.S. Navy
has no rivals today in its capacity to impose and sustain such
blockades,” greatly understate China’s ability to catch up,
saying it and others such as India, Japan and Russia are “at least
20 years away from developing the fleet strength, naval-supply
networks, and operational skills needed to mount sustained
blockades far from their home ports.” In the case of Beijing, I’d
say it’s more like 10, and there’s a topic that’s been bothering me
more and more these days .Micronesia. The United States is
willingly giving it up and as I have personal experience here it’s
troubling and a major mistake on the foreign policy front.
Blair and Lieberthal don’t mention Micronesia but when they
state China won’t have “naval-supply networks” for 20 years,
they could be wrong. I know one place, Yap, that China is
working its way into now and this could be a critical staging area
some day. I’ll have more in an upcoming “Week in Review”
column. For today, suffice it to say that I’m disturbed my
packages to my friends on Yap are no longer treated as U.S. mail
as they once were. These poor, yet highly strategic islands, are
up for grabs and China is taking advantage of this.
---
Hott Spotts will return in two weeks. I need to work on some
other projects over the coming months so this column will
probably be every two weeks for a spell.
Brian Trumbore
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