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08/02/2007
Negotiating with Pyongyang
As I sift through the pile of periodicals here at StocksandNews, I
wanted to bring up a viewpoint on North Korea that I find
interesting, in light of Kim Jong-il’s vow to allow international
inspections after suspending operations at the Yongbyon nuclear
facility as part of the Feb. 13 six-party agreement.
Mitchell Reiss, former State Department official and now vice
provost for International Affairs at the College of William &
Mary, had some of the following thoughts on the coming
negotiations in the May/June issue of The National Interest.
While he wrote his essay before Kim agreed to open up
Yongbyon, Reiss’ arguments remain pertinent.
In Reiss’ view, the White House has been divided into two
camps: “those who oppose engagement on ideological grounds
and those who oppose it on more pragmatic grounds.”
Both say, however, that engagement weakens the resolve of the
other members of the six-party talks. And going forward the key
will be the ‘working groups,’ which Reiss expects North Korea
to use to push for additional concessions.
“As we all know, the devil is in the details. Let me cite just one
example: How do we handle North Korea’s nuclear devices?
The IAEA is not going to be allowed to verify or take possession
of any nuclear devices. And we don’t want any South Korean or
Japanese officials to have this responsibility or, indeed, officials
from any non-nuclear weapons state. So we will have to work
out how to do this with the Chinese, Russians and, of course, the
North Koreans. Assuming we even get that far, that promises to
be a very interesting conversation.”
Reiss, who has experience negotiating directly with Pyongyang,
says the North Koreans don’t have a very deep diplomatic bench,
meaning “at some point in each of these working groups an
impasse will be reached.”
Further, “At that time, the United States should expect that one
or more of the other parties will pressure the United States to
make additional concessions to appease North Korea.”
We also have to think about how each move in the process
relates to Japan and South Korea. Ballistic missiles, for instance,
haven’t been part of any negotiations as yet, while Japan remains
concerned about the abductions of its citizens and conservatives
in South Korea caution on Seoul providing excessive benefits to
Pyongyang without insisting on reciprocal measures. Reiss adds
on this last point, “Such a reaction could result in South Korea
further lowering its defenses, both psychologically and militarily,
against a country that still poses a severe threat.”
But, today, one can’t deny that suspending operations at
Yongbyon is a positive development, though going forward, will
any future agreements on the nuclear weapons front be
verifiable?
Mitchell Reiss:
“What we do know is that the negotiations over verification and
compliance are going to be contentious .
“A pertinent question to ask is: How much certainty do we need
in order to have confidence that the North’s entire nuclear-
weapons program has been fully captured? Under the terms of
the (Feb. 13) statement, the North will have to ‘discuss a list of
all its nuclear programs’ and then allow the IAEA to monitor
their nuclear dismantlement (or presumably removal from the
country). The very idea that there needs to be a discussion at all
suggests that Pyongyang sees this process as a further
negotiation, and not a mere recital or inventorying of its nuclear
facilities.
“At issue is not whether North Korea can be trusted to keep its
part of any bargain – it can’t. Rather, the challenge is to craft
reciprocal steps so that at any point in this process the United
States is not in a worse position than it would be otherwise
should North Korea start backsliding.”
The most optimistic scenario is that North Korea abandon its
programs for significant economic rewards and thus encourage
Iran to negotiate a surrender of its weapons program.
Mitchell Reiss:
“However, there are two factors that undercut this more
optimistic scenario. First, it is likely that the time frame in which
North Korea denuclearizes, if that happens at all, would be at
odds with the time frame for an Iranian decision on whether to
produce enough enriched uranium for nuclear devices. In other
words, technical progress in the Iranian program may present
Tehran with a critical choice well before the North Korea case
plays itself out. Under that scenario, North Korea would not
really be relevant.
“Second, it seems more likely that Tehran will determine the
future of its nuclear program according to whether a nuclear
arsenal advances its national security, enhances its status or
satisfies important domestic constituencies, compared to the
alternatives available.”
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Hot Spots returns next week.
Brian Trumbore
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