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12/06/2007
Russia / Update
Dimitri K. Simes is one of my favorite Russian experts.
President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National
Interest, he had some thoughts on “Losing Russia: The Costs of
Renewed Confrontation” in the November/December 2007 issue
of Foreign Affairs. In light of the election results in Russia this
past weekend, understanding Russia is even more important.
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“Faced with threats from al Qaeda and Iran and increasing
instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States does not
need new enemies. [Ed. I just have to interject that I’m assuming
Simes would alter his language on Iraq these days. It’s not a
great situation, but instability is not increasing.] Yet its
relationship with Russia is worsening by the day. The rhetoric
on both sides is heating up, security agreements are in jeopardy,
and Washington and Moscow increasingly look at each other
through the old Cold War prism.
“Although Russia’s newfound assertiveness and heavy-handed
conduct at home and abroad have been the major causes of
mutual disillusionment, the United States bears considerable
responsibility for the slow disintegration of the relationship as
well. Moscow’s maladies, mistakes, and misdeeds are not an
alibi for U.S. policymakers, who made fundamental errors in
managing Russia’s transition from an expansionist communist
empire to a more traditional great power.
“Underlying the United States’ mishandling of Russia is the
conventional wisdom in Washington, which holds that the
Reagan administration won the Cold War largely on its own.
But this is not what happened, and it is certainly not the way
most Russians view the demise of the Soviet state. Washington’s
self-congratulatory historical narrative lies at the core of its
subsequent failures in dealing with Moscow in the post-Cold
War era.
“Washington’s crucial error lay in its propensity to treat post-
Soviet Russia as a defeated enemy. The United States and the
West did win the Cold War, but victory for one side does not
necessarily mean defeat for the other. Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and their advisers
believed that they had all joined the United States’ side as victors
in the Cold War. They gradually concluded that communism
was bad for the Soviet Union, and especially Russia. In their
view, they did not need outside pressure in order to act in their
country’s best interest.
“Despite numerous opportunities for strategic cooperation over
the past 16 years, Washington’s diplomatic behavior has left the
unmistakable impression that making Russia a strategic partner
has never been a major priority. The administrations of Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush assumed that when they needed
Russian cooperation, they could secure it without special effort
or accommodation. The Clinton administration in particular
appeared to view Russia like postwar Germany or Japan – as a
country that could be forced to follow U.S. policies and would
eventually learn to like them. They seemed to forget that Russia
had not been occupied by U.S. soldiers or devastated by atomic
bombs. Russia was transformed, not defeated. This profoundly
shaped its responses to the United States.
“Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has not acted like a
client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend – but nor has it
behaved like an enemy, much less an enemy with global
ambitions and a hostile and messianic ideology. Yet the risk that
Russia may join the ranks of U.S. adversaries is very real today.”
Simes offers that Mikhail Gorbachev is far more responsible for
the disintegration of the Soviet Union than Ronald Reagan.
Reagan certainly contributed by increasing pressure on the
Kremlin, but Gorbachev made all the important decisions, such
as in drastically reducing subsidies for the Warsaw Pact regimes
and allowing free elections in the Baltics, which assured they
would leave the USSR. However:
“The Reagan and first Bush administrations understood the
dangers of a crumbling superpower and managed the Soviet
Union’s decline with an impressive combination of empathy and
toughness. They treated Gorbachev respectfully but without
making substantive concessions at the expense of U.S. interests.
This included promptly rejecting Gorbachev’s increasingly
desperate requests for massive economic assistance, because
there was no good reason for the United States to help him save
the Soviet empire.”
And when Gorbachev urged Bush 41 not to attack Saddam
Hussein after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the White House didn’t “rub
his nose in it,” as then Secretary of State James Baker put it. “As
a result, the United States was able to simultaneously defeat
Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union,
largely on Washington’s terms.”
Simes then adds, “If the George H.W. Bush administration can
be criticized for anything, it is for failing to provide swift
economic help to the democratic government of the newly
independent Russia in 1992. Observing the transition closely,
former President Richard Nixon pointed out that a major aid
package could stop the economic free fall and help anchor Russia
in the West for years to come. Bush, however, was in a weak
position to take a daring stand in helping Russia. By this time,
he was fighting a losing battle with candidate Bill Clinton, who
was attacking him for being preoccupied with foreign policy at
the expense of the U.S. economy.”
Then Clinton came into office and aggressively sought to help
Russia, mostly through the IMF. But, “The Clinton
administration’s greatest failure was its decision to take
advantage of Russia’s weakness. The administration tried to get
as much as possible for the United States politically,
economically, and in terms of security in Europe and the former
Soviet Union before Russia recovered from the tumultuous
transition. Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot has
also revealed that U.S. officials even exploited Yeltsin’s
excessive drinking during face-to-face negotiations.”
Then Russia sobered up and was ticked off. Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev, who accommodated the West, once told Talbot,
“It’s bad enough having you people tell us what you’re going to
do whether we like it or not. Don’t add insult to injury by also
telling us that it’s in our interests to obey your orders.”
Simes:
“But such pleas fell on deaf ears in Washington, where this
arrogant approach was becoming increasingly popular .By
sending the message that Russia should not have an independent
foreign policy – or even an independent domestic one – the
Clinton administration generated much resentment.”
At the time, former President Nixon “recognized the folly of the
U.S. approach and urged compromise between Yeltin and the
more conservative Duma. Nixon was disturbed when Russian
officials told him that the United States had expressed its
willingness to condone the Yeltsin administration’s decision to
take ‘resolute’ steps against the Duma so long as the Kremlin
accelerated economic reforms. Nixon warned that ‘encouraging
departures from democracy in a country with such an autocratic
tradition as Russia’s is like trying to put out a fire with
combustible materials.’ Moreover, he argued that acting on
Washington’s ‘fatally flawed assumption’ that Russia was not
and would not be a world power for some time would imperil
peace and endanger democracy in the region.”
The Clinton administration ignored Nixon, with the end result
being Yeltsin forced through a new constitution giving the
president sweeping powers at the expense of the parliament.
Then in late 1999, Vladimir Putin, now prime minister, “made a
major overture to the United States just after ordering troops into
Chechnya. He was troubled by Chechen connections with al
Qaeda and the fact that Taliban-run Afghanistan was the only
country to have established diplomatic relations with Chechnya.
Motivated by these security interests, rather than any newfound
love for the United States, Putin suggested that Moscow and
Washington cooperate against al Qaeda and the Taliban. This
initiative came after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and
the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, by
which time the Clinton administration had more than enough
information to understand the mortal danger the United States
faced from Islamic fundamentalists.”
“But Clinton and his advisers increasingly saw Russia not as a
potential partner but as a nostalgic, dysfunctional, financially
weak power at whose expense the United States should make
whatever gains it could. Thus they sought to cement the results
of the Soviet Union’s disintegration by bringing as many post-
Soviet states as possible under Washington’s wing .What the
Clinton administration did not appreciate, however, was that it
was also giving away a historic opportunity to put al Qaeda and
the Taliban on the defensive, destroy their bases, and potentially
disrupt their ability to launch major operations. Only after nearly
3,000 U.S. citizens were killed on September 11, 2001, did this
cooperation finally begin.”
Then post-9/11, “Putin reiterated his longstanding offer of
support against al Qaeda and the Taliban,” but relations remained
strained in other areas thanks to Bush’s announcement to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, “one of the last
remaining symbols of Russia’s former superpower status, further
wounding the Kremlin’s pride. Likewise, Russian animosity
toward NATO only grew after the alliance incorporated the three
Baltic states, two of which – Estonia and Latvia – had unresolved
disputes with Russia relating principally to the treatment of
ethnic Russian minorities.”
And then there was Ukraine and its Orange Revolution. The
U.S., in its support of Viktor Yushchenko, was helping to
undermine Russia’s influence in a neighboring state with
significant cultural ties going back to the 17th century. And there
was Georgia, another formerly in the Soviet sphere. As Simes
writes: “The sense in the Kremlin is that the United States cares
about using democracy as an instrument to embarrass and isolate
Putin more than it cares about democracy itself.”
But all of the above aside, Russia is not yet a formal enemy of
the U.S. The Kremlin has not supported al Qaeda or any other
terrorist group at war with the United States, nor has it threatened
its neighbors with invasion. Simes adds, though, “they are no
longer willing to adjust their behavior to fit U.S. preferences,
particularly at the expense of their own interests.”
Simes concludes:
“The good news is that although Russia is disillusioned with the
United States and Europe, it is so far not eager to enter into an
alliance against the West. The Russian people do not want to
risk their new prosperity – and Russia’s elites are loath to give up
their Swiss bank accounts, London mansions, and Mediterranean
vacations. Although Russia is seeking greater military
cooperation with China, Beijing does not seem eager to start a
fight with Washington either .
“But if the current U.S.-Russian relationship deteriorates further,
it will not bode well for the United States and would be even
worse for Russia .(where) some top officials are beginning to
champion the idea of a foreign policy realignment directed
against the West .
“It would be reckless and shortsighted to push Russia in that
direction by repeating the errors of the past, rather than working
to avoid the dangerous consequences of a renewed U.S.-Russian
confrontation. But ultimately, Moscow will have to make its
own decisions. Given the Kremlin’s history of poor policy
choices, a clash may come whether Washington likes it or not.
And should that happen, the United States must approach this
rivalry with greater realism and determination than it has
displayed in its halfhearted attempts at partnership.”
Hot Spots will return in two weeks, Dec. 20. I’m in Germany
next week.
Brian Trumbore
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