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05/03/2001
U.S. / China / Taiwan
With all of the recent talk about U.S. - China relations, as well as
President Bush''s announcement of future arms sales to Taiwan, I
thought it was a good time to review the history of the various
relationships, including the genesis of the Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979, along with China''s views, as spelled out in its "White
Paper" of last year. What follows is excerpted from pieces I did
back in September of 1999.
At the end of World War II, the Communists in China, led by
Mao Zedong, fought with the ruling Nationalist forces under the
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao, a brilliant strategist,
overcame his basic lack of resources and led his peasant army to
victory over the resource rich, U.S.-backed, Nationalist army.
By April 1949, Mao was in control of most of the major
provinces and soon thereafter Chiang was driven off the
mainland, onto the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Chiang then
established the Republic of China (ROC), while in Beijing, Mao
declared the People''s Republic of China (PRC) on September 21,
1949.
Two days after the announcement of the formation of the PRC,
U.S. President Truman announced, "We have evidence an atomic
explosion occurred in the USSR." Now we had twin threats to
deal with and, of course, many Americans felt that traitors in our
own country had supplied Stalin with the bomb, while others had
allowed his puppet Mao to defeat Chiang''s Nationalists. It was
also assumed that Mao would be under the direct influence of
Stalin.
In a speech in early 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
spoke of the new line of containment and mentioned that he felt
it was certain that Stalin and Mao would quarrel, but he didn''t
note Taiwan, Indochina, or Korea, appearing to exclude them
from the U.S. defense perimeter. Stalin took this as an invitation
to create mischief in Korea, in part as a way of teaching China
where its true interests should lie.
So Stalin wanted a limited proxy war in Korea, as in a little push
across the 38th parallel. But North Korea''s Kim Il Sung took
Stalin''s overture as a green light for a massive invasion of the
South, which he launched on June 25, 1950.
As a result of the Korean conflict, Taiwan became a far larger
issue and the U.S. adopted a firm stance. And with China''s
subsequent involvement in the war, the need to deter Mao
became quite clear.
What was also clear as the 1950s unfolded, was the fact that
China''s bark was bigger than its bite. It was the American
military link with Taiwan and Japan that deterred Beijing from
acting on its ambition to grab Taiwan. In the 1960s, events in
Indochina took center stage, and finally, in 1971, the world
received word that President Nixon was going to China in early
1972.
The trip took place in late February. Nixon and Chinese Premier
Chou En-lai signed a communique, an important part of which
dealt with Taiwan. In his book "In the Arena," Nixon writes:
"Instead of trying to paper over differences with mushy,
meaningless, diplomatic gobbledygook, each side expressed its
position on the issues where we disagreed. On the (painful) issue
of Taiwan, we stated the obvious fact that the Chinese on the
mainland and on Taiwan agreed that there was one China. We
expressed our position that the differences between the two
should be settled peacefully. And on the great issue which made
this historic rapprochement possible, the communique stated that
neither nation ''should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region
and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of
countries to establish such hegemony.''"
Most historians would agree that Nixon''s recognition of China
was his finest hour. And Taiwan was not sacrificed. But even
Nixon couldn''t complete the full normalization of U.S. ties with
China, which would have to wait until 1979 and the Carter
Administration.
By the time President Carter took the reins of power, the vast
majority of nations in the world had begun to recognize China as
the legitimate leader of all Chinese. [Taiwan had been expelled
from the U.N. in 1971.] For its part, Taiwan didn''t help its own
cause as the island was ruled first by dictator Chiang Kai-shek,
and later his equally bad son. Political reform was slow in
coming... with democracy really only taking hold over the past
7-9 years.
At the time of Carter''s inauguration, he was anxious to formally
normalize relations with China, but at the same time, he didn''t
want to sell out Taiwan. The U.S. had a Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taipei and we had troops stationed on the island. While it
was assumed that the troops would be withdrawn, Carter wanted
a liason office in Taiwan as a pretext to normalizing relations
with Beijing. But newly elected Chinese Communist Party boss
Deng Xiao-Ping said "No." Deng felt it would promote the
image of two Chinas; one China, one Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Carter had a war on his hands with his staff,
especially between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, as the two fought over
influence. Bottom line, Zbig almost blew it. [You can check out
my 9/16/99 piece for more details.]
Deng wanted no further arms sales to Taiwan, after allowing for
those already in the pipeline. He had been prepared to offer
Taiwan near total autonomy, granting it its own political and
economic system - even its own military - but under the banner
of one China, with national sovereignty residing in Beijing.
"One country, two systems."
But while China thought the U.S. had agreed to no further arms
sales to Taiwan, President Carter and Zbig thought they would be
allowed limited sales of defensive weapons to the island. So
when Carter was set to announce the historic agreement with
China, Deng received word of the U.S. understanding on
weapons sales and requested an emergency meeting with the
U.S. representative to China, Leonard Woodcock. Carter had to
be able to reassure Congress that limited defensive arms sales
would continue. Deng disagreed. He argued that Taiwan
wouldn''t have the incentive to go to the negotiating table, and
eventually China would have to use force to recover Taiwan.
But in the end, Deng suddenly gave in and allowed the sale.
Carter went before the American people to discuss the deal.
Conservatives like Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater
slammed it as a sellout of Taiwan. Former President Ford,
however, supported it. An angry Congress then transformed the
"Act" to the Taiwan Relations Act, which included a strong
security commitment to Taiwan. Relations with China, however,
were now normalized.
Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has guided our policy. It
is purposefully nebulous. It doesn''t clearly state that the U.S.
would immediately come to Taiwan''s aid if the island came
under attack. It is, of course, implied that we would; "grave
consequences," but we don''t say what those would be. Today,
however, President Bush certainly seems to have made it
abundantly clear, an attack on Taiwan by China is an attack on
the U.S.
Next week, China''s "White Paper."
Brian Trumbore
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