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10/18/2001
Trends: Middle East and South Asia
Last January 11 and 18 in this space, I reviewed some
conclusions made in a report titled "Global Trends 2015" which
was released by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in
December 2000. The NIC is a 15-member board, which operates
under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency and its
director, George Tenet. The purpose of the report was to assess
the various threats that the U.S. and the world face over the
coming 15 years.
Well, I''ve reread the report and decided to pick out some areas I
didn''t refer to myself back in January. Some of this will be
slightly repetitive, but it''s interesting to note the "hits" as well as
"misses" in designating the threats that we suddenly face less
than one year after the report was released. Like everything else
in this world, the arena of geopolitics is on a fast track. Perhaps
the document should have been titled "Global Trends 2003.
In January I chose to focus on the topic of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), particularly as it pertained to nations like
China and North Korea, as well as the issue of globalization and
the world economy. Following are snippets that pertain directly
to the Middle East and the Asian sub-continent. *Everything
from here on is a quote from the report. The first two are taken
from my 1/18/01 piece, the rest are new...which also shows you
that I wasn''t totally focusing on the right issues either.
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--The Middle East - Most regimes are change resistant and there
is little positive change in the region, raising the prospects for
increased demographic pressures, social unrest, religious and
ideological extremism, and terrorism directed both at the regimes
and at their Western supporters."
--India - Global trends conflict significantly in India...The
unevenness of its internal economic growth, with a growing gap
between rich and poor, and serious questions about the fractious
nature of its politics, all cast doubt on how powerful India will be
by 2015. Whatever its degree of power, India''s rising ambition
will further strain its relations with China, as well as complicate
its ties with Russia, Japan, and the West - and continue its
nuclear standoff with Pakistan.
--By 2015, Christianity and Islam, the two largest religious
groupings, will have grown significantly. Both are widely
dispersed in several continents, already use information
technologies to "spread the faith," and draw on adherents to fund
numerous nonprofit groups and political causes. Activist
components of these and other religious groupings will emerge to
contest such issues as genetic manipulation, women''s rights, and
the income gap between rich and poor.
--India will strengthen its role as a regional power, but many
uncertainties about the effects of global trends on its society cast
doubt on how far India will go. India faces growing extremes
between wealth and poverty, a mixed picture on natural
resources, and problems with internal governance.
--The changing dynamics of state power will combine with other
factors to affect the risk of conflict in various regions. Changing
military capabilities will be prominent among the factors that
determine the risk of war. In South Asia, for example, that risk
will remain fairly high over the next 15 years. India and Pakistan
are both prone to miscalculation. [Editor note: This is something
that is especially scary given the current environment.] Both will
continue to build up their nuclear and missile forces.
--India most likely will expand the size of its nuclear-capable
force. Pakistan''s nuclear and missile force also will continue to
increase. Islamabad has publicly claimed that the number of
nuclear weapons and missiles it deploys will be based on
"minimum" deterrence and will be independent of the size of
India''s arsenal. A noticeable increase in the size of India''s
arsenal, however, would prompt Pakistan to further increase the
size of its own arsenal.
--In the Middle East, the confluence of domestic economic
pressures and regional rivalries is likely to further the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver them. By contrast, spending on conventional arms
probably will remain stable or decline in most countries. Some
governments may maintain large armed forces to absorb
otherwise unemployable youths, but such armies will be less well
trained and equipped. Rather than conventional war, the region
is likely to experience more terrorism, insurgencies, and
humanitarian emergencies arising from internal disparities or
disputes over ethnic or religious identity.
--Iraq''s ability to obtain WMD will be influenced, in part, by the
degree to which the UN Security Council can impede
development or procurement over the next 15 years. Under some
scenarios, Iraq could test an ICBM capable of delivering nuclear-
sized payloads to the United States before 2015; foreign
assistance would affect the capabilities of the missile and the
time it became available. Iraq could also develop a nuclear
weapon during this period. [Editor: It may already have.]
--The risks of escalation inherent in direct armed conflict will be
magnified by the availability of WMD; consequently,
proliferation will tend to spur a reversion to prolonged, lower-
level conflict by other means: intimidation, subversion,
terrorism, proxies, and guerrilla operations. This trend already is
evident between Israel and some of its neighbors and between
India and Pakistan. In the event of war, urban fighting will be
typical and consequently, civilian casualties will be high relative
to those among combatants. Technology will count for less, and
large, youthful, and motivated populations for more.
Exploitation of communal divisions within an adversary''s civil
populations will be seen as a key to winning such conflicts -
increasing bitterness and thereby prolonging them.
--Chemical and biological threats to the United States will
become more widespread; such capabilities are easier to develop,
hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons. Some terrorists or
insurgents will attempt to use such weapons against US interests
(against the United States itself, its forces or facilities overseas,
or its allies). Moreover, the US would be affected by the use of
such weapons anywhere in the world because Washington would
be called on to help contain the damage and to provide scientific
expertise and economic assistance to deal with the effects. Such
weapons could be delivered through a variety of means,
including missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or covertly via
land, air, and sea. [Editor: They almost nailed this.]
--The widening strategic and economic gaps between India and
Pakistan will define the South Asian region in 2015...India will
be the unrivaled regional power with a large military...and
Pakistan will be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on
international financial assistance.
--Pakistan will not recover easily from decades of political and
economic mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness,
corruption, and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will
produce little change in the face of opposition from an
entrenched political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further
domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who
may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter
the makeup and cohesion of the military - once Pakistan''s most
capable institution. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil,
the central government''s control probably will be reduced to the
Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.
--Prospects for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka in 2015
appear bleak. Decades of foreign domination and civil war have
devastated Afghanistan''s society and economy, and the country
is likely to remain internationally isolated, a major narcotics
exporter, and a haven for Islamic radicals and terrorist groups.
--The threat of major conflict between India and Pakistan will
overshadow all other regional issues during the next 15 years.
Continued turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan will spill over
into Kashmir and other areas of the subcontinent, prompting
Indian leaders to take more aggressive preemptive and retaliatory
actions. [Editor: We saw some of this in just the past few days.]
--Political Islam in various forms will be an attractive alternative
for millions of Muslims throughout the region, and some radical
variants will continue to be divisive social and political forces.
--Old rivalries among core states - Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran -
will reemerge.
--With the exception of Israel, Middle Eastern states will view
globalization more as a challenge than an opportunity. Although
the Internet will remain confined to a small elite due to relatively
high cost, undeveloped infrastructures, and cultural obstacles, the
information revolution and other technological advances
probably will have a net destabilizing effect on the Middle East
by raising expectations, increasing income disparities, and
eroding the power of regimes to control information or mold
popular opinion. Attracting foreign direct investment will also
be difficult. [Editor: You got that right!!]
--The future direction of Turkey, both internally and
geopolitically, will have a major impact on the region, and on US
and Western interests...By dint of its history, location, and
interests, Turkey will continue to pay attention to its neighbors to
the north - in the Caucasus and Central Asia - and to the south
and east - Syria, Iraq and Iran...Ankara will find itself having to
cope with regional rivalries...proliferation of WMD, the politics
and economics of energy transport, and water rights.
**The report concluded in part:
The trends outlined in this study are based on the combination of
drivers that are most likely over the next 15 years. Nevertheless,
the drivers could produce trends quite different from the ones
described. [Other possibilities]
--Serious deterioration of living standards for the bulk of the
population in several major Middle Eastern countries and the
failure of Israel and the Palestinians to conclude even a "cold
peace," lead to serious, violent political upheavals in Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
--A state of major concern to US strategic interests - such as
Iran, Nigeria, Israel, or Saudi Arabia - fails to manage serious
internal religious or ethnic divisions and crisis ensues. [Editor:
Flying under the radar these days is the deteriorating situation in
Nigeria.]
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Well, there you have it. Again, these conclusions are from
December 2000. George Tenet remains the Director of the CIA.
Brian Trumbore
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