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Wall Street History
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10/11/2002
Taft-Hartley
With the recent lockout of the longshoremen on the West Coast, and the move by the Bush Administration to invoke the Taft- Hartley Act of 1947 to get them back to work, I thought we’d take a brief look at the genesis of the legislation that the President relied on for his decision.
Following World War II, labor unions in America were no longer constrained by the war’s no-strike laws and organized labor began to flex its muscles. By early 1946, some 1.9 million workers had been, or were, on strike, including crippling job actions by the United Mine Workers and the railroad unions.
The unions had flourished under the New Deal policies of Franklin Roosevelt, but with the new strife in the labor markets, the public was getting more than a bit upset, the feeling being that the unions had already received more than their fair share.
By the time the election of 1946 rolled around, Republicans had themselves an issue, and, with President Truman seemingly losing control of the situation, they campaigned with slogans such as “To err is Truman” and the simple, yet amazingly effective, “Had enough?”, the latter message referring to the fact that the Democrats had controlled both houses of Congress since the 1932 election. With an escalating crisis, both sides of the various labor disputes blamed the President and the Republicans swept into power in November, gaining a 51-45 advantage in the Senate and 245-188 (with “others”) in the House. [The Democrats’ advantage in the prior Congress was 56-38, 242- 190.]
As the new Congress convened in 1947, the Republicans introduced 17 labor-oriented initiatives the very first day, most relating to the belief that labor leaders had become way too strong for their own britches and needed to be reined in. The prime result was passage of the Taft-Hartley Act (named after co-sponsors Representative Fred Hartley and Senator Robert Taft). President Truman vetoed the measure, with his feelings perhaps best expressed in the following two examples, the first being a letter to Senate Minority Leader Alben Barkley.
“Dear Senator Barkley:
“I feel so strongly about the labor bill which the Senate will vote on this afternoon that I wish to reaffirm my sincere belief that it will do serious harm to our country.
“This is a critical period in our history, and any measure which will adversely affect our national unity will render a distinct disservice not only to this nation but to the world.
“I am convinced that such would be the result if the veto of this bill should be overridden.
“I commend you and your associates who have fought so earnestly against this dangerous legislation.
“I want you to know you have my unqualified support, and it is my fervent hope, for the good of the country, that you and your colleagues will be successful in your efforts to keep this bill from becoming law.”
[Source: “The New York Times Century of Business”]
Separately, as part of his formal veto message, Truman added that the bill would “reverse the basic direction of our national labor policy, inject the government into private economic affairs on an unprecedented scale, and conflict with important principles of our democratic society. Its provisions would cause more strikes, not fewer. It would contribute neither to industrial peace nor to economic stability and progress...It contains seeds of discord which would plague this nation for years to come.”
[Source: “The Growth of the American Republic”]
Alas, Truman’s veto was overriden by a 68-25 margin in the Senate. So what did Taft-Hartley prescribe?
For starters, the Act banned closed shops (in which nonunion workers could not be hired), permitted union shops (in which all workers pay union dues even if they don’t belong to it), prohibited jurisdictional strikes (by one union to exclude another from a given company or field), “featherbedding” (pay for work not done), required a 60-day cooling-off period for strikes; authorized an 80-day injunction against strikes that might affect national health or safety; forbade political contributions from unions and excessive dues; required union leaders to take a non- Communist oath, forbade strikes by federal employees, and it made unions liable for breach of contract or damages resulting from jurisdictional disputes. [In the case of the dockworkers, President Bush invoked the ‘80-day’ clause.]
The political result of Taft-Hartley was to drive organized labor back into President Truman’s arms, and in 1948 union members turned out in droves to make for the difference in Truman’s spectacular upset against Thomas Dewey. The Democrats recaptured the Senate, 54-42, as well as the House, 263-171. [Nice swings in those days, eh?] One of the Republicans that went down was Fred Hartley himself.
Organized labor had bitterly opposed Taft-Hartley, calling it a “slave labor” bill, but Truman’s promise to repeal the Act in 1949 still met with defeat. Being pragmatic about it, over the previous 50 years or so, first business had all the advantages and then labor leaders had them, so, as in the words of Senator Taft, the purpose was to “swing the balance back to where the two sides (could) deal equally with each other.” Not that this ended up being the case, mind you, but it sounded good.
[A little side note about the 1948 election, Congressman Lyndon Johnson, while a Democrat, had a conservative constituency, so he supported Taft-Hartley. It was a crucial stance, as Johnson defeated his primary opponent in the highly disputed Senate primary fight that year, one which he captured by all of 87 votes, amidst charges that his people stuffed the ballot boxes. Johnson then handily whipped his Republican opponent to win the seat, after which he changed his stance on Taft-Hartley, of course.]
On a related topic, in the midst of the Korean War in 1952, President Truman had to deal with a steel strike. He didn’t want to invoke Taft-Hartley and rile up the unions anymore than necessary, but in effect he did, as he seized the mills in the name of the government. But the mill owners went all the way to the Supreme Court, which in a powerful judgment that has influenced the application of executive power ever since (“Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company vs. Sawyer Sawyer being the Secretary of Commerce), invalidated Truman’s seizure of the mills.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that only Congress could have authorized the seizure, and in this instance it refused to do so. Justice Black wrote for the majority:
“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”
As author Bernard Schwartz notes, “Black was saying the President had no power to seize private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production,” even in his role as Commander in Chief.
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Sources:
“American Heritage: The Presidents,” edited by Michael Beschloss “America: A Narrative History,” George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi “The Growth of the American Republic” Morison, Commager, Leuchtenburg “American Law in the 20th Century” Lawrence M. Friedman “The Presidents” edited by Henry F. Graff “The New York Times Century of Business” Floyd Norris and Christine Bockelmann “A History of the Supreme Court” Bernard Schwartz
Brian Trumbore
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