The Future of Energy Prices, Part I

The Future of Energy Prices, Part I

Awhile back I had a two-part story on OPEC and its relation to

the U.S. equity market as part of my “Wall Street History” link.

The story was mostly about the oil shocks of the 1970s. But

recently I read an article in the Jan./Feb. issue of “Foreign

Affairs” magazine which gave me pause. The authors, Amy

Myers Jaffe and Robert Manning, are negative on the future of oil

prices. I then remembered a piece from the Mar./Apr., 1998 issue

of the same periodical which has proved, thus far, to be somewhat

prescient. You”ll recall that back in the spring of 1998, and

throughout that year, oil prices were tumbling, down to about the

$10-$11 level (as measured by W. Texas crude). It was early in

1999 that they began to climb and in virtually a straight line

throughout the year to finish at the $25.60 level (after hitting $27

late last fall).

The author of the 1998 piece was noted oil expert Daniel Yergin.

Yergin was bullish on the future long-term price of oil. So who is

going to be right over the next decade? Well, let”s examine each

side over the next two weeks and then you can make up your

own mind.

As I write this, oil is trading at the $25 level. The bullish case is

built around the feeling that the production cuts which OPEC

engineered last spring will hold. In addition, the bulls say that

world stockpiles (inventories) will continue to be drawn down,

primarily because the global economy is gaining strength. One

noted expert, Charles Maxwell, believes that over time oil will

continue to surprise to the upside. Morgan Stanley strategist

Byron Wien is also in agreement with Maxwell.

The bears on oil would argue that, to the contrary, OPEC doesn”t

have a chance at maintaining the discipline they have so far on the

production quotas. They never have in the past. The next

compliance data may also show that the bears may be right. It”s

possible that the production targets are only being met about 70%

of the time (as opposed to the 85-90% compliance throughout

1999). In addition, the bears believe that we still have a

worldwide glut of oil, particularly when you take into

consideration the non-OPEC production which has generally been

in an uptrend for some time. But, this week we will focus on

Yergin”s bullish scenario.

Yergin was writing his 1998 piece at the height of the Asian

financial crisis and his comments mostly deal with that continent.

Back then, he was expecting the Asian economies to rebound

fairly quickly (which they obviously have) and that after a pause,

Asian energy consumption would rise again in just 2-3 years (it

already is).

Yergin writes, “The reason (why demand will rise) is that there

really was an Asian economic miracle, and the conditions for high

growth – discipline, flexibility, high savings, rapid absorption of

technology, embrace of international markets, and strong

entrepreneurial networks – are still in place.”

“The source of the economic crisis is in the badly regulated

private financial sector. Once Asia begins to recover, meeting the

region”s energy needs will again become a preoccupation – and an

anxiety.”

It has always been felt by doom and gloomsters like yours truly

that the specter of increasing demand for energy in Asia would

produce tensions, competition and outright conflict between the

region”s larger nations. Yergin argues that these gloomy

scenarios of conflict are unlikely to materialize because “of a sea

change in the approaches to economics and conflict around the

world.” He argues that market-based solutions will be the norm.

One impact of the slowing demand that was witnessed until the

later part of 1999 was that the pressure came off many of the

Asian governments to continue to implement energy planning.

After all, it should be remembered that during the period 1990-

95, the demand for oil increased about 5% a year. For example,

by 1993 China moved from being a net exporter of oil to a net

importer, representing a fundamental change in Asia”s energy

balance.

In the future, Asia”s export-driven industrialization and its

dramatic increase in the use of cars and other fossil fuel-powered

transportation, coupled with rapid urbanization and

electrification, will combine to increase energy demand at a

projected annual rate of 4-5% through 2010. Yergin says this is

in contrast to an annual global rise of about 2% during the same

period. Growing by 4% a year, Asia”s oil demand will account

for more than 50% of the global increase.

The net increase in oil imports up through 2010 will be 9 million

barrels per day or more. Yergin projects that Indonesia and

Malaysis will join China as net importers of oil over the next

decade. As Indonesia now provides about 20% of Asia”s total oil

production, by 2005 the current net oil exports could disappear

due to domestic demand. [Of course, the domestic strife that

continues to sweep the nation will have something to say about

the timetable.]

And if you”re wondering about the impact of new exploration in

the Asian region (like the South China Sea), Yergin believes that,

regardless, Asia is destined to import more than 20 million barrels

of oil per day, compared with 11-12 million today. [Again, these

figures are from an article now 2 years old so I added the “12th”

million based on the current expansion taking place].

As for China and the South China Sea, why won”t this strategic

waterway become a future battleground over 1) potential

exploration and 2) actual shipments of the black gold? Yergin

believes that China”s leadership is sensitive to the importance of

securing its own energy needs. By 2010 China could be

importing almost 50% of its total oil demand which must come

from the Middle East or Central Asia. The last thing they want is

turmoil in the region which would upset their formula for the

economic transformation of the country. So rather than conflict,

Yergin sees a growing “mutuality of interest, increasing reliance

on free markets, cross-border energy trade (especially when it

comes to natural gas) and cooperation with Middle East

producers.”

Yes, it always comes down to the politics of oil. And in the

growth scenario that Yergin envisions, a $20 plus price for oil

would seem to be low given the projections on supply and

demand.

Next week, the other side….and why the U.S. is foolishly

pursuing the potential reserves from the Caspian basin.

*In the interest of full disclosure, I currently have a substantial

position in energy-related issues. I will, however, refrain from

issuing my own forecast.

Brian Trumbore