NCAA Men’s Basketball Quiz: 1) List the top ten in number of
tournament appearances, including 2004. 2) List the top 5 in
Final Four appearances. Answers below.
As you know, from time to time I use this space for an in depth
discussion of history or current events by including speeches
given by some of the world’s political leaders, both past and
present. Since we are at the one-year anniversary of the start of
the war in Iraq, following is a presentation given by British
Prime Minister Tony Blair on March 5, 2004. It’s as good an
explanation of why this war was necessary as any you’ll read.
[This is long and I was going to try and edit it, but some speeches
need to be read in total.]
—
Tony Blair
No decision I have ever made in politics has been as divisive as
the decision to go to war in Iraq. It remains deeply divisive
today. I know a large part of the public want to move on.
Rightly they say the Government should concentrate on the
issues that elected us in 1997: the economy, jobs, living
standards, health, education, crime. I share that view, and we
are. But I know too that the nature of this issue over Iraq,
stirring such bitter emotions as it does, can’t just be swept away
as ill-fitting the pre-occupations of the man and woman on the
street. This is not simply because of the gravity of war; or the
continued engagement of British troops and civilians in Iraq; or
even because of reflections made on the integrity of the Prime
Minister. It is because it was in March 2003 and remains my
fervent view that the nature of the global threat we face in Britain
and round the world is real and existential and it is the task of
leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost;
and that the true danger is not to any single politician’s
reputation, but to our country if we now ignore this threat or
erase it from the agenda in embarrassment at the difficulties it
causes.
In truth, the fundamental source of division over Iraq is not over
issues of trust or integrity, though some insist on trying to
translate it into that. Each week brings a fresh attempt to get a
new angle that can prove it was all a gigantic conspiracy. We
have had three inquiries, including the one by Lord Hutton
conducted over six months, with more openness by Government
than any such inquiry in history, that have affirmed there was no
attempt to falsify intelligence in the dossier of September 2002,
but rather that it was indeed an accurate summary of that
intelligence.
We have seen one element – intelligence about some WMD
being ready for use in 45 minutes – elevated into virtually the
one fact that persuaded the nation into war. This intelligence
was mentioned by me once in my statement to the House of
Commons on 24 September and not mentioned by me again in
any debate. It was mentioned by no-one in the crucial debate on
18 March 2003. In the period from 24 September to 29 May, the
date of the BBC broadcast on it, it was raised twice in almost
40,000 written Parliamentary Questions in the House of
Commons; and not once in almost 5,000 oral questions. Neither
was it remotely the basis for the claim that Saddam had strategic
as well as battlefield WMD. That was dealt with in a different
part of the dossier; and though the Iraq Survey Group have
indeed not found stockpiles of weapons, they have uncovered
much evidence about Saddam’s program to develop long-range
strategic missiles in breach of UN rules.
It is said we claimed Iraq was an imminent threat to Britain and
was preparing to attack us. In fact this is what I said prior to the
war on 24 September 2002:
“Why now? People ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or
next, even this year or next he will use his weapons.”
Then, for example, in January 2003 in my press conference I
said:
“And I tell you honestly what my fear is, my fear is that we wake
up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial states
has used weapons of mass destruction – and Iraq has done so in
the past – and we get sucked into a conflict, with all the
devastation that would cause; or alternatively these weapons,
which are being traded right round the world at the moment, fall
into the hands of these terrorist groups, these fanatics who will
stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction on a
mass scale. Now that is what I have to worry about. And I
understand of course why people think it is a very remote threat
and it is far away and why does it bother us. Now I simply say to
you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together, and I
regard them as two sides of the same coin.”
The truth is, as was abundantly plain in the motion before the
House of Commons on 18 March, we went to war to enforce
compliance with UN Resolutions. Had we believed Iraq was an
imminent direct threat to Britain, we would have taken action in
September 2002; we would not have gone to the UN. Instead,
we spent October and November in the UN negotiating UN
Resolution 1441. We then spent almost 4 months trying to
implement it.
Actually, it is now apparent from the Survey Group that Iraq was
indeed in breach of UN Resolution 1441. It did not disclose
laboratories and facilities it should have; nor the teams of
scientists kept together to retain their WMD including nuclear
expertise; nor its continuing research relevant to CW and BW.
As Dr. Kay, the former head of the ISG who is now quoted as a
critic of the war has said: “Iraq was in clear violation of the terms
of Resolution 1441.” And “I actually think this (Iraq) may be
one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we
thought.”
Then, most recently is the attempt to cast doubt on the Attorney
General’s legal opinion. He said the war was lawful. He
published a statement on the legal advice. It is said this opinion
is disputed. Of course it is. It was disputed in March 2003. It is
today. The lawyers continue to divide over it – with their legal
opinions bearing a remarkable similarity to their political view of
the war.
But let’s be clear. Once this row dies down, another will take its
place and then another and then another.
All of it in the end is an elaborate smokescreen to prevent us
seeing the real issue: which is not a matter of trust but of
judgment.
The real point is that those who disagree with the war, disagree
fundamentally with the judgment that led to war. What is more,
their alternative judgment is both entirely rational and arguable.
Kosovo, with ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians, was not a
hard decision for most people; nor was Afghanistan after the
shock of September 11; nor was Sierra Leone.
Iraq in March 2003 was an immensely difficult judgment. It was
divisive because it was difficult. I have never disrespected those
who disagreed with the decision. Sure, some were anti-
American; some against all wars. But there was a core of
sensible people who faced with this decision would have gone
the other way, for sensible reasons. Their argument is one I
understand totally. It is that Iraq posed no direct, immediate
threat to Britain; and that Iraq’s WMD, even on our own case,
was not serious enough to warrant war, certainly without a
specific UN resolution mandating military action. And they
argue: Saddam could, in any event, be contained.
In other words, they disagreed then and disagree now
fundamentally with the characterization of the threat. We were
saying this is urgent; we have to act; the opponents of war
thought it wasn’t. And I accept, incidentally, that however
abhorrent and foul the regime and however relevant that was for
the reasons I set out before the war, for example in Glasgow in
February 2003, regime change alone could not be and was not
our justification for war. Our primary purpose was to enforce
UN resolutions over Iraq and WMD.
Of course the opponents are boosted by the fact that though we
know Saddam had WMD; we haven’t found the physical
evidence of them in the 11 months since the war. But in fact,
everyone thought he had them. That was the basis of UN
Resolution 1441.
It’s just worth pointing out that the search is being conducted in a
country twice the land mass of the UK, which David Kay’s
interim report in October 2003 noted, contains 130 ammunition
storage areas, some covering an area of 50 square miles,
including some 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets and other
ordnance, of which only a small proportion have as yet been
searched in the difficult security environment that exists.
But the key point is that it is the threat that is the issue.
The characterization of the threat is where the difference lies.
Here is where I feel so passionately that we are in mortal danger
of mistaking the nature of the new world in which we live.
Everything about our world is changing: its economy, its
technology, its culture, its way of living. If the 20th century
scripted our conventional way of thinking, the 21st century is
unconventional in almost every respect.
This is true also of our security.
The threat we face is not conventional. It is a challenge of a
different nature from anything the world has faced before. It is
to the world’s security, what globalization is to the world’s
economy.
It was defined not by Iraq but by September 11th. September 11th
did not create the threat Saddam posed. But it altered crucially
the balance of risk as to whether to deal with it or simply carry
on, however imperfectly, trying to contain it.
Let me attempt an explanation of how my own thinking, as a
political leader, has evolved during these past few years.
Already, before September 11th the world’s view of the
justification of military action had been changing. The only clear
case in international relations for armed intervention had been
self-defense, response to aggression. But the notion of
intervening on humanitarian grounds had been gaining currency.
I set this out, following the Kosovo war, in a speech in Chicago
in 1999, where I called for a doctrine of international
community, where in certain clear circumstances, we do
intervene, even though we are not directly threatened. I said this
was not just to correct injustice, but also because in an
increasingly inter-dependent world, our self-interest was allied to
the interests of others; and seldom did conflict in one region of
the world not contaminate another. We acted in Sierra Leone for
similar reasons, though frankly even if that country had become
run by gangsters and murderers and its democracy crushed, it
would have been a long time before it impacted on us. But we
were able to act to help them and we did.
So, for me, before September 11th, I was already reaching for a
different philosophy in international relations from a traditional
one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648;
namely that a country’s internal affairs are for it and you don’t
interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers
an obligation of alliance. I did not consider Iraq fitted into this
philosophy, though I could see the horrible injustice done to its
people by Saddam.
However, I had started to become concerned about two other
phenomena.
The first was the increasing amount of information about Islamic
extremism and terrorism that was crossing my desk. Chechnya
was blighted by it. So was Kashmir. Afghanistan was its
training ground. Some 300 people had been killed in the attacks
on the USS Cole and US embassies in East Africa. The
extremism seemed remarkably well financed. It was very active.
And it was driven not by a set of negotiable political demands,
but by religious fanaticism.
The second was the attempt by states – some of them highly
unstable and repressive – to develop nuclear weapons programs,
CW and BW material, and long-range missiles. What is more, it
was obvious that there was a considerable network of individuals
and companies with expertise in this area, prepared to sell it.
All this was before September 11th. I discussed the issue of
WMD and President Bush at our first meeting in Camp David in
February 2001. But it’s in the nature of things that other issues
intervene – I was about to fight for re-election – and though it
was raised, it was a troubling specter in the background, not
something to arrest our whole attention.
President Bush told me that on September 9, 2001, he had a
meeting about Iraq in the White House when he discussed
“smart” sanctions, changes to the sanctions regime. There was
no talk of military action.
September 11th was for me a revelation. What had seemed
inchoate came together. The point about September 11th was not
its detailed planning; not its devilish execution; not even, simply,
that it happened in America, on the streets of New York. All of
this made it an astonishing, terrible and wicked tragedy, a
barbaric murder of innocent people. But what galvanized me
was that it was a declaration of war by religious fanatics who
were prepared to wage that war without limit. They killed 3,000.
But if they could have killed 30,000 or 300,000 they would have
rejoiced in it. The purpose was to cause such hatred between
Muslims and the West that a religious jihad became reality; and
the world engulfed by it.
When I spoke to the House of Commons on 14 September 2001 I
said:
“We know, that they (the terrorists) would, if they could, go
further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of
mass destruction. We know, also, that there are groups of
people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and
capability of such weapons. It is time that this trade was
exposed, disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by
the events of 11 September, and we should act on the warning.”
From September 11th on, I could see the threat plainly. Here
were terrorists prepared to bring about Armageddon. Here were
states whose leadership cared for no-one but themselves; were
often cruel and tyrannical towards their own people; and who
saw WMD as a means of defending themselves against any
attempt external or internal to remove them and who, in their
chaotic and corrupt state, were in any event porous and
irresponsible with neither the will nor capability to prevent
terrorists who also hated the West, from exploiting their chaos
and corruption.
I became aware of the activities of AQ Khan, former Pakistani
nuclear scientist and of an organization developing nuclear
weapons technology to sell secretly to states wanting to acquire
it. I started to hear of plants to manufacture nuclear weapons
equipment in Malaysia, in the Near East and Africa, companies
in the Gulf and Europe to finance it; training and know-how
provided – all without any or much international action to stop it.
It was a murky, dangerous trade, done with much sophistication
and it was rapidly shortening the timeframe of countries like
North Korea and Iran in acquiring serviceable nuclear weapons
capability.
I asked for more intelligence on the issue not just of terrorism but
also of WMD. The scale of it became clear. It didn’t matter that
the Islamic extremists often hated some of these regimes. Their
mutual enmity toward the West would in the end triumph over
any scruples of that nature, as we see graphically in Iraq today.
We knew that Al Qaeda sought the capability to use WMD in
their attacks. Bin Laden has called it a “duty” to obtain nuclear
weapons. His networks have experimented with chemicals and
toxins for use in attacks. He received advice from at least two
Pakistani scientists on the design of nuclear weapons. In
Afghanistan, Al Qaeda trained its recruits in the use of poisons
and chemicals. An Al Qaeda terrorist ran a training camp
developing these techniques. Terrorist training manuals giving
step-by-step instructions for the manufacture of deadly
substances such as botulinum and ricin were widely distributed
in Afghanistan and elsewhere and via the Internet. Terrorists in
Russia have actually deployed radiological material. The sarin
attack on the Tokyo Metro showed how serious an impact even a
relatively small attack can have.
The global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to
act to eliminate it.
First we dealt with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, removing the
Taliban that succored them.
But then we had to confront the states with WMD. We had to
take a stand. We had to force conformity with international
obligations that for years had been breached with the world
turning a blind eye. For 12 years Saddam had defied calls to
disarm. In 1998, he had effectively driven out the UN inspectors
and we had bombed his military infrastructure; but we had only
weakened him, not removed the threat. Saddam alone had used
CW against Iran and against his own people.
We had had an international coalition blessed by the UN in
Afghanistan. I wanted the same now. President Bush agreed to
go the UN route. We secured UN Resolution 1441. Saddam had
one final chance to comply fully. Compliance had to start with a
full and honest declaration of WMD programs and activities.
The truth is disarming a country, other than with its consent, is a
perilous exercise. On 8 December 2002, Saddam sent his
declaration. It was obviously false. The UN inspectors were in
Iraq but progress was slow and the vital cooperation of Iraqi
scientists withheld. In March we went back to the UN to make a
final ultimatum. We strove hard for agreement. We very nearly
achieved it.
So we came to the point of decision. Prime Ministers don’t have
the luxury of maintaining both sides of the argument. They can
see both sides. But, ultimately, leadership is about deciding. My
view was and is that if the UN had come together and delivered a
tough ultimatum to Saddam, listing clearly what he had to do,
benchmarking it, he may have folded and events set in train that
might just and eventually have led to his departure from power.
But the Security Council didn’t agree.
Suppose at that point we had backed away. Inspectors would
have stayed but only the utterly naïve would believe that
following such a public climb down by the US and its partners,
Saddam would have cooperated more. He would have strung the
inspectors out and returned emboldened to his plans. The will to
act on the issue of rogue states and WMD would have been
shown to be hollow. The terrorists, watching and analyzing
every move in our psychology as they do, would have taken
heart. All this without counting the fact that the appalling
brutalization of the Iraqi people would have continued unabated
and reinforced.
Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing
would have happened. Possible that Saddam would change his
ambitions; possible he would develop the WMD but never use it;
possible that the terrorists would never get their hands on WMD,
whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. Perhaps
we would have found different ways of reducing it. Perhaps this
Islamic terrorism would ebb of its own accord.
But do we want to take the risk? That is the judgment. And my
judgment then and now is that the risk of this new global
terrorism and its interaction with states or organizations or
individuals proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not prepared
to run.
This is not a time to err on the side of caution; not a time to
weigh the risks to an infinite balance; not a time for the cynicism
of the worldly wise who favor playing it long. Their worldly
wise cynicism is actually at best naivete and at worst dereliction.
When they talk, as they do now, of diplomacy coming back into
fashion in respect of Iran or North Korea or Libya, do they
seriously think that diplomacy alone has brought about this
change? Since the war in Iraq, Libya has taken the courageous
step of owning up not just to a nuclear weapons program but to
having chemical weapons, which are now being destroyed. Iran
is back in the reach of the IAEA. North Korea in talks with
China over its WMD. The AQ Khan network is being shut
down, its trade slowly but surely being eliminated.
Yet it is monstrously premature to think the threat has passed.
The risk remains in the balance here and abroad.
These days decisions about it come thick and fast, and while they
are not always of the same magnitude they are hardly trivial. Let
me give you an example. A short while ago, during the war, we
received specific intelligence warning of a major attack on
Heathrow. To this day, we don’t know if it was correct and we
foiled it or if it was wrong. But we received the intelligence.
We immediately heightened the police presence. At the time it
was much criticized as political hype or an attempt to frighten the
public. Actually at each stage we followed rigidly the advice of
the police and Security Service. But sit in my seat. Here is the
intelligence. Here is the advice. Do you ignore it? But, of
course intelligence is precisely that; intelligence. It is not hard
fact. It has its limitations. On each occasion the most careful
judgment has to be made taking account of everything we know
and the best assessment and advice available. But in making that
judgment, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be
wrong? Or not to act and hope it’s OK? And suppose we don’t
act and the intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will
people be?
And to those who think that these things are all disconnected,
random acts, disparate threats with no common thread to bind
them, look at what is happening in Iraq today. The terrorists
pouring into Iraq, know full well the importance of destroying
not just the nascent progress of Iraq toward stability, prosperity
and democracy, but of destroying our confidence, of defeating
our will to persevere.
I have no doubt Iraq is better without Saddam; but no doubt
either, that as a result of his removal, the dangers of the threat we
face will be diminished. That is not to say the terrorists won’t
redouble their efforts. They will. This war is not ended. It may
only be at the end of its first phase. They are in Iraq, murdering
innocent Iraqis who want to worship or join a police force that
upholds the law not a brutal dictatorship; they carry on killing in
Afghanistan. They do it for a reason. The terrorists know that if
Iraq and Afghanistan survive their assault, come through their
travails, seize the opportunity the future offers, then those
countries will stand not just as nations liberated from oppression,
but as a lesson to humankind everywhere and a profound
antidote to the poison of religious extremism. That is precisely
why the terrorists are trying to foment hatred and division in
Iraq. They know full well, a stable democratic Iraq, under the
sovereign rule of the Iraqi people, is a mortal blow to their
fanaticism.
That is why our duty is to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan as stable
and democratic nations.
Here is the irony. For all the fighting, this threat cannot be
defeated by security means alone. Taking strong action is a
necessary but insufficient condition for defeating. Its final defeat
is only assured by the triumph of the values of the human spirit.
Which brings me to the final point. It may well be that under
international law as presently constituted, a regime can
systematically brutalize and oppress its people and there is
nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and even
sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a
humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass
graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be
something of a catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it
be?
We know now, if we didn’t before, that our own self interest is
ultimately bound up with the fate of other nations. The doctrine
of international community is no longer a vision of idealism. It
is a practical recognition that just as within a country, citizens
who are free, well educated and prosperous tend to be
responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a
stake; so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from
economic progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in the
advance of humankind. The best defense of our security lies in
the spread of our values.
But we cannot advance these values except within a framework
that recognizes their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs
a global response, based on global rules.
The essence of a community is common rights and
responsibilities. We have obligations in relation to each other. If
we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept
in a community that others have a right to oppress and brutalize
their people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human
race and each individual in it.
Containment will not work in the face of the global threat that
confronts us. The terrorists have no intention of being contained.
The states that proliferate or acquire WMD illegally are doing so
precisely to avoid containment. Emphatically I am not saying
that every situation leads to military action. Bu we surely have a
duty and a right to prevent the threat materializing; and we surely
have a responsibility to act when a nation’s people are subjected
to a regime such as Saddam’s. Otherwise, we are powerless to
fight the aggression and injustice which over time puts at risk our
security and way of life.
Which brings us to how you make the rules and how you decide
what is right or wrong in enforcing them. The UN Universal
Declaration on Human Rights is a fine document. But it is
strange the United Nations is so reluctant to enforce them.
I understand the worry the international community has over
Iraq. It worries that the US and its allies will by sheer force of
their military might, do whatever they want, unilaterally and
without recourse to any rule-based code or doctrine. But our
worry is that if the UN – because of a political disagreement in
its Councils – is paralyzed, then a threat we believe is real will
go unchallenged.
This dilemma is at the heart of many peoples’ anguished
indecision over the wisdom of our action in Iraq. It explains the
confusion of normal politics that has part of the right liberating a
people from oppression and a part of the left disdaining the
action that led to it. It is partly why the conspiracy theories or
claims of deceit have such purchase. How much simpler to
debate those than to analyze and resolve the conundrum of our
world’s present state.
Britain’s role is try to find a way through this: to construct a
consensus behind a broad agenda of justice and security and
means of enforcing it.
This agenda must be robust in tackling the security threat that
this Islamic extremism poses; and fair to all peoples by
promoting their human rights, wherever they are. It means
tackling poverty in Africa and justice in Palestine as well as
being utterly resolute in opposition to terrorism as a way of
achieving political goals. It means an entirely different, more
just and more modern view of self-interest.
It means reforming the United Nations so its Security Council
represents 21st century reality; and giving the UN the capability
to act effectively as well as debate. It means getting the UN to
understand that faced with the threats we have, we should do all
we can to spread the values of freedom, democracy, the rule of
law, religious tolerance and justice for the oppressed, however
painful for some nations that may be; but that at the same time,
we wage war relentlessly on those who would exploit racial and
religious division to bring catastrophe to the world.
But in the meantime, the threat is there and demands our
attention.
That is the struggle which engages us. It is a new type of war. It
will rest on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It
demands a different attitude to our own interests. It forces us to
act even when so many comforts seem unaffected, and the threat
so far off, if not illusory. In the end, believe your political
leaders or not, as you will. But do so, at least having understood
their minds.
Stuff
–If you are laughing at my pick of Gonzaga to go all the way,
just know I picked Maryland in 2002. [Bar Chat 3/14/02…the
editor is getting extremely defensive.]
–Hey, just because I picked Murray State to beat Illinois doesn’t
also mean I’m able to keep track of what the Murray State
players are doing in their free time! [In case you missed it, two
of them were arrested on drug charges. Of course I want them to
play anyway…the heck with doing what’s right, it’s tournament
time, folks!]
–Luke Jackson is a future star in the NBA who just finished up
his career at Oregon. I loved his answer to the question “What
will your job be in five years? 20 years?” as posed by the Wall
Street Journal.
“I will be in the NBA in five years. Averaging about 19.3 points
per game and 8.2 rebounds. In 20 years I will be 42 living in a
small town somewhere, teaching my sons about God, Larry Bird
and the Pistol, in that order.”
You da man, Luke!
–Again, I couldn’t give a damn about the health of those major
league baseball players taking steroids.
–Did you see the story of the woman in Narrows, VA who left
her basement window open for her pet cats, went downstairs to
fetch a beer or something, and found a bobcat there instead?
Well the bobcat did a number on her, but she survived. I don’t
know how many times I have to tell you folks; never, ever, leave
your basement window open! What if there was a tiger in the
area, or a hippo? Surely, the story then would have had a
different ending.
–And Johnny Mac passed along a distressing tale from Brisbane,
Australia. It seems this woman was tending her garden when a
kangaroo viciously attacked her. Neighbors say there is a gang
of 50 or so ‘roos that have been wreaking havoc. So Johnny and
I are of course concerned about the fact that the giant marsupials
are organizing just like the Bloods and Crips in America. It’s
due to a shortage of role models, no doubt, and I would also
suggest they probably need more after school programs. Leave
no ‘roo behind!
–First, Philadelphia has to deal with Allen Iverson, who threw
up brick after brick the other night in the first game following his
walkout. Now, Philly’s Eagles have acquired Mr. Sharpie,
Terrell Owens, another potential winner of the ‘Bar Chat
Lifetime Achievement Award, dirtball category.’ As my friend
from down that way, Mark R., said, wait until Donovan McNabb
hits Owens in the ankle with a pass…then see how Terrell reacts.
–Georgetown fired head basketball coach Craig Esherick, even
though just last year they signed him to an extension through
2008-09. In other words, Esherick is paid another five years for
sitting on his ass. Or, to put it a different way, look for tuition to
soar at the school in order to pay for this fiasco.
Top 3 songs for the week of 3/19/77: #1 “Love Theme From ‘A
Star Is Born’ (Evergreen)” (Barbra Streisand) #2 “Fly Like An
Eagle” (Steve Miller) #3 “Rich Girl” (Daryl Hall and John
Oates)
NCAA Basketball Quiz Answers: 1) Tournament appearances:
Kentucky, 46; UCLA, 38; North Carolina, 36; Kansas, 32;
Indiana, 32; Louisville, 31; Syracuse, 29; Duke, 28; St. John’s,
27; Notre Dame, 27. [St. John’s, 27-29, and Notre Dame, 29-31,
are only schools on this list with losing records in tourney play.]
2) Top Five in Final Fours: UCLA, 15; North Carolina, 15;
Duke, 13; Kentucky, 13; Kansas, 11.
Next Bar Chat, Tuesday….the Women’s Hall of Fame.
Explosive stuff…the editor may face a suspension afterwards.
