Gorbachev and Yelstin, Part II

Gorbachev and Yelstin, Part II

The more I read on the 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev,

the more I want to share with you. As you read this, I think you

will recognize the parallels to today. So, if you don”t mind, I”m

going to “milk” this story for a few more weeks.

[If you ever want to read a terrific book on this era, pick up the

Pulitzer Prize-winning “Lenin”s Tomb,” by David Remnick (now editor-

in-chief of the New Yorker, if I”m not mistaken). I have also relied

on “Russia: A History” by Gregory Freeze, “A History of Modern

Europe” by John Merriman and “The Oxford History of the Twentieth

Century” edited by Michael Howard and Wm. Roger Louis].

So when we last left Gorby it was August of 1991 and he was

headed on vacation.

“Sometimes you gotta get rid of the bad blood”

–The Godfather

Before we discuss the comic-opera that was the August 1991

coup, let”s go back a bit to reinforce how out of touch Gorbachev

became. You have to picture that when he took power in 1985

and unleashed glasnost there was an opening of the archives and

an avalanche of truth about slaughters, forced collectivizations,

and sundry other dastardly deeds.

As reported in David Remnick”s book, here are some of the

quotes of that day from Soviet politicians and journalists.

“Imagine being an adult and nearly all the truth you know about

the world around you and outside your own country has to be

absorbed in a matter of a year or two.”

“The entire country is still in a state of mass denial.”

For the elite in the Communist Party, “The truth challenged their

existence, their comfort and privileges. Their right to a decent

office, a cut of meat, the month of vacation in the Crimea – it all

depended on a colossal social deception.”

From morning to night, everything negative from the past was

being dumped on them. You can begin to see why the coup

attempt was inevitable. Since history was no longer an

instrument of the Party, the Party was doomed to failure. The

coup leaders wanted to turn back the clock and make fear, once

again, the essence of the state.

Even before foreign minister Edouard Shevardnadze warned of a

return to dictatorship as he resigned in December 1990, there

were clear signs for Gorbachev.

A Politboro document in March 1990 said, “Distrust in official

structures and administrative structures grows. Use all means of

propoganda to stop the discrediting of the army, the KGB, and

the police. Disarm the [opposition] ideologically and undermine

them in the eyes of society.”

The coup was being announced in advance. A Major General

Filatov said, “It”s a pity we have no Beria [Lavrenti – Stalin”s

henchman] now; if he had read today”s (liberal newspaper), he

would have shot half the staff and sent the remaining rubbish to

rot in a camp.”

On June 20th 1991, foreign minister Bessmertnykh

(Shevardnadze”s successor) received an urgent call from U.S.

Sec. of State James Baker while the two were holding a series of

meetings in Berlin. Baker needed to see Bessmertnykh (B)

ASAP, without staff and in a secure place. Baker then told B “It

seems there may be an attempt to depose Gorby.” B, upon his

return to Moscow informed Gorby who said he would have a

tough talk with those suspected of moving against him. He did

and told B not to worry.

Just one week before President Bush landed in Moscow for a

summit with Gorby, a leading paper of the reactionaries

published an appeal called “A Word to the People.” “Our

Motherland is dying, breaking apart and plunging into darkness

and nothingness. Our home is already burning to the

ground…the bones of the people are being ground up and the

backbone of Russia is snapped in two. How is it that we have let

people come to power who do not love their country, who

kowtow to foreign patrons and seek advice and blessings

abroad?”

[Does this sound familiar? A little like the reactionaries of today

and their talk on Kosovo.]

Meanwhile, Boris Yeltsin had been working on his new Treaty of

the Union for the republics (referred to in the 6/3 installment).

Yeltsin wanted the power of the purse and he made it his goal to

convince Gorbachev that the republics, not Moscow, should have

the ability to levy taxes and distribute the funds as they saw fit.

Yeltsin took the opportunity to once again warn Gorby about the

people he was surrounding himself with. Mikhail said, “These

guys (the eventual coup leaders) are not as bad as you think.”

So who were these “not so bad” guys. The main coup leaders

would turn out to be Vice President Yanayev, Defense Minister

Yazov, Prime Minister Pavlov, Interior Minister Pugo, Supreme

Soviet Chairman (and long-time Gorby loyalist) Lukyanov,

presidential chief of staff Boldin and KGB Chief Kryuchkov.

While Bush was in Moscow that July, Interior Minister Pugo”s

men slaughtered 8 Lithuanian border police, humiliating

Gorbachev. Yanayev had called Fidel Castro (you”ll recall

relations were strained between Moscow and Havana) and told

him, “Soon there will be a change for the better.” Yegor

Yakovlev, a good man and Gorby loyalist resigned in July and

told him “The people around you are rotten. Please, finally,

understand this.” “You exaggerate,” said Gorby.

So on August 6th, Gorby flew to the Crimea. Kryuchkov called

his aides to work on the first declaration of the State Committee

for the State of Emergency. Gorby was to return to Moscow on

August 20th to sign the new Union Treaty with Yeltsin and the

other republican leaders.

Lenin wrote in 1917, “To approach a rebellion in a Marxist way,

it is necessary not to lose a minute moving loyal battalions to the

most important objects, to arrest the government…to seize the

telegraph and telephone. One cannot at this critical moment

remain true to Marxism and not treat rebellion as an art.”

On August 18th Gorbachev”s phone lines at his dacha went dead.

Conclusion, next week.

Brian Trumbore