The Iranian Revolution, Part II

The Iranian Revolution, Part II

By the summer of 1978 the Shah was in deep trouble. In August

400 people died in a fire at a cinema. Although evidence

available after the Revolution suggested that the fire was

deliberately started by religiously inclined students, the

opposition carefully cultivated a widespread conviction that the

fire was the work of the secret police (Savak). On September 7th

the government declared martial law in Tehran to combat

demonstrations that had been growing in the city. On the 8th,

troops fired into a crowd. The official death toll of 87 was on the

light side. This came to be known as “Black Friday.” It

radicalized the opposition and made compromise with the

regime, even by the moderates, less likely. [The parallels to the

recent student -led protests in Tehran are striking].

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khomenei, who had been expelled from

Iraq and forced to set up shop in Paris, was able to publicize his

movement before the world press. It also made for easier

communication with his lieutenants in Tehran and other Iranian

cities, thus permitting better coordination of the opposition

movement. And political and religious leaders, who were cut off

from Khomenei while he was in Iraq, were now able to visit him

for direct consultations.

Khomenei was born in 1900. He preached the 7th-century

lessons of the Shari”a (Islamic Law) and campaigned for the

ouster of the Shah. The goal was to install a modern theocracy

(in which leaders are “divinely” inspired)

On November 5, 1978, after violent demonstrations in Tehran,

the Shah addressed the nation for the first time in many months

declaring he had heard the people”s “revolutionary message,”

and promised to correct past mistakes. Too bad. The strikes

resumed, shutting down the government, and clashes between

demonstrators and troops became a daily occurrence.

By the end of the year, the Shah began exploratory talks with

members of the moderate opposition. Shapour Baktiar agreed to

form a government on the condition that the Shah leave the

country. The Shah, announcing he was going abroad for a short

holiday, left the country on January 16, 1979. As his aircraft

took off, celebrations broke out across the country.

The first prime minister was Mehdi Bazargan, not Baktiar.

Bazargan, however, headed a government that controlled neither

the country nor even its own bureaucratic apparatus. Central

authority had broken down. A range of political groups, from the

far left to the far right, were vying for power.

The “Supreme Leader,” Ayatollah Khomenei, did not consider

himself bound by the government. On February 1st, he landed

from exile in Paris to tumultuous acclaim. In his book “The

American Century,” Harold Evans writes of this time, “Possibly,

a letter then from (President) Carter apologizing for past U.S.

interference might have appeased Khomeini, who blamed Savak

and ultimately the U.S. for the deaths of both his father and his

son. Little understood outside the country was how real and

explosive was Iranian resentment of generations of exploitation

by one foreign power or another, and how much the Shiite

Muslim clergy (of which Khomenei was one) detested the

infiltration of Western cultural values on everything from the

status of women to rock ”n” roll.”

Khomenei had established the Revolutionary Council while he

was in exile. It was composed of clerics close to Khomenei,

political leaders identified with Bazargan, and two

representatives of the armed forces. While Bazargan”s cabinet

was to serve as the executive authority, it was the Revolutionary

Council that wielded supreme decision-making and legislative

authority.

Differences quickly emerged between the cabinet and the

council. The cabinet wanted a return to normalcy and rapid

reassertion of central authority. Clerics of the Revolutionary

Council, more responsive to the Islamic and popular temper of

the mass of their followers, generally favored more radical

economic and social measures. They also proved more willing

and able to mobilize and to use the street crowd and the

revolutionary organizations to achieve their ends.

Revolutionary courts were soon established in Tehran and

provincial centers. The Tehran court passed death sentences on

four of the Shah”s generals on February 16th; all four were

executed by firing squad on the roof of the building housing

Khomenei”s headquarters. More executions followed on a daily

basis.

The activities of these “courts” became a focus of intense

controversy. Left-wing political groups and clerics pressed hard

for “revolutionary justice” for miscreants of the former regime.

On the other hand, lawyers and human rights groups protested

the arbitrary nature of the revolutionary courts, the vagueness of

charges and the absence of defense lawyers. Prime Minister

Bazargan shut down their activities on March 14th. The courts

were reestablished on April 6th with new guidelines. The next

day, despite international please for clemency, Hoveyda, the

Shah”s prime minister for twelve years, was put to death.

Bazargan met with President Carter”s national security adviser,

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Algiers, on November 1st. Meanwhile,

the Shah, who was seriously ill, was admitted to the U.S. for

medical treatment (he had been living in Mexico). Iranians

feared that the Shah would use this visit to the U.S. to secure

support for an attempt to overthrow the Islamic Republic. On

November 1st hundreds of thousands marched in Tehran to

demand the Shah”s extradition, while the press denounced

Bazargan for meeting with a key U.S. official. By November 6th

Bazargan resigned and no prime minister was named to replace

him. Just two days earlier, young men who later designated

themselves “students of the Imam”s line,” occupied the U.S.

embassy.

Next week, the Hostage Crisis and the next step in the Iranian

Revolution.

Brian Trumbore