Rekyavik

Rekyavik

I didn”t see or hear one report on the parallels that can be drawn

from the current discussions between the U.S. and Russia over

the ABM Treaty and the Rekyavik Summit between Reagan and

Gorbachev back in 1986. So I”ll tackle it.

The Antiballistic Missile Treaty was signed between Nixon and

Brezhnev in 1972. The treaty was designed to prevent the two

nations from deploying antimissile defense systems which, it was

felt, would lead to a further escalation in the arms race. The

prevailing opinion is that if one side had a sizable defense, the

other would have to build even more numerous, powerful

offensive weapons that could be used to overwhelm the other

opponents defense. And the endless, deadly cycle would just get

worse.

Enter Ronald Reagan. In 1982 he approved an effort to come up

with a defensive shield, in theory at first. Just one year later, he

announced to the nation that research would commence on the

Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) or SDI. Given

Reagan”s antipathy towards the Soviet Union it was a bold move,

though one that was ridiculed in the mainstream press.

Reagan had labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” yet a

change had occurred at the top of the Kremlin in the form of

Mikhail Gorbachev. [Check the archives for a detailed

assessment of Gorby]. The two of them held their first summit in

Geneva – November, 1985.

The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin

was present in Geneva and Rekyavik. At one point the following

conversation took place between the two leaders, as witnessed by

Dobrynin.

Reagan: [Regarding SDI] “It”s not an offensive system. I am

talking about a shield, not a spear.”

Gorbachev: “The reality is that SDI would open a new arms

race…Why don”t you believe me when I say the Soviet Union

will never attack? Why then should I accept your sincerity in

your willingness to share SDI research when you don”t even share

your advanced technology with your allies?”

Reagan was angry.

Gorbachev: “Mr. President. I disagree with you, but I can see

you really believe it.”

Between 11/85 and 10/86, there were 25 personal messages

between Reagan and Gorbachev. In February of ”86, Gorbachev

had confided to Dobrynin and other close aides, “Maybe it is time

to stop being afraid of SDI? The U.S. is counting on our

readiness to build the same kind of costly system, hoping

meanwhile that they will win this race using their technological

superiority.”

Gorby thought the Soviet Union could come up with a way to

overwhelm the system. But under the influence of the military –

industrial complex, he gradually began to revert to his insistence

on Reagan”s withdrawal from SDI as the condition for the

success of a new summit on disarmament. He was persuaded that

SDI would give the U.S. a first-strike advantage in nuclear

conflicts. [Since the U.S. would feel secure behind its shield, the

U.S. could attack first with impunity].

The summit in Rekyavik was held October 11-12, 1986. There

were supposed to be lots of different items on the agenda.

Instead there was only one that the two leaders wanted to discuss.

Reducing nukes. Reagan and Gorbachev met for 9 hours and 48

minutes of face-to-face meetings. Gorbachev came armed with

lots of proposals in nearly every area of arms control. He and

Reagan astonishingly agreed on a first step to cut strategic

nuclear forces in half. Then they got excited about the prospect

of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether, including missiles and

strategic bombers. “I have a picture,” Reagan said, “that after ten

years you and I come to Iceland and bring the last two missiles in

the world and have the biggest damn celebration of it!”

Reagan would later say that “one lousy word” spoiled the picture.

SDI. Gorbachev insisted on confining SDI to “laboratory”

testing. And Reagan would not give up his pet project.

Remarkably he offered to share it. Gorbachev was worried about

the first-strike capability the U.S. might then possess. At

midnight the talks broke off and they walked in silence from the

conference site.

“Mr. President,” said Gorbachev when they reached Reagan”s

car, “you have missed a unique chance of going down in history

as a great president who paved the way for nuclear disarmament.”

A gloomy Reagan answered: “That applies to both of us.”

I”ll never forget that scene on the television. The media had a

field day with Reagan. Gorbachev was the international darling

of the moment. Clearly, it was Reagan who had missed a golden

opportunity to make progress in the arms race. Meanwhile, his

own aides were appalled that he had offered to give up all nuclear

weapons.

But back in Moscow, there was a different feeling. Dobrynin

wrote, “As an eyewitness at Rekyavik, I feel Gorbachev was no

less responsible than Reagan for its failure because he held SDI

hostage for the success of the meeting. It could have been

postponed for further consideration if they had reached agreement

on a deep reduction of nuclear weapons.”

Historian Paul Johnson has a different take. “The effect of SDI

was to add to the stresses on the Soviet economy and thus

eventually destroy the totalitarian states. SDI allowed the U.S. to

make full use of its advanced technology, where it held a big (and,

as it turned out, growing) lead over the Soviet Union. SDI was

an example of Reagan”s ability to grasp a big new idea, simplify it,

and give it all it was worth, including presenting it to the

American people with consummate skill. It was the most

important change in American strategic policy since the adoption

of containment and the foundation of NATO.”

By February, 1987, Gorbachev said he would no longer let SDI

stand in the way of a treaty to remove missiles from Europe and

Asia. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty the leaders signed

on December8, 1987, led to the first-ever agreement to destroy

nuclear missiles: 859 of America”s and 1836 Soviet missiles with

a range of 300 to 3400 miles. It was unprecedented and heroic,

on both sides.

Personally, I get a kick out of those right wing members of my

party who make idiotic statements like “the U.S. never benefited

from an arms control treaty.” By sticking to SDI in ”86, Reagan

was able to accomplish a significant achievement in the

elimination of the Intermediate Nuclear Force in Europe.

Undoubtedly, we will have future conflicts with Russia. At least

this is one class of weapon Europe doesn”t have to worry about.

*In light of Edmund Morris biography of Reagan, “Dutch,” I

thought it would be interesting to share the thoughts of Anatoly

Dobrynin. Dobrynin was in Reagan”s company on many

occasions, many of a tense nature. I trust his impressions more

than those of Morris.

“One of the keys to the puzzle of this unique personality was that

opponents and experts alike clearly underestimated him. The

president proved to be a much deeper person than he first

appeared. There is no denying that Reagan had a poor

conception of our relations and did not like examining their

intricacies, especially those concerning arms negotiations, yet he

struck it lucky, and more often than any other president. His

supposedly guileless personality also helped him to get away with

many things; he fully deserved the nickname of the “Teflon

President” conferred on him.

“Reagan was endowed with natural instinct, flair, and optimism.

His imagination supported big ideas like SDI. He presented his

own image skillfully, and it appealed to millions. In no small

measure it was rooted in his confident and promising nature,

which was not necessarily prompted by wisdom and knowledge

but by personal conviction and character. He skillfully

manipulated public opinion by means of strong illustrative

catchwords which oversimplified complex questions and therefore

flew straight over the heads of the professionals into the hearts

and minds of the millions, for good or ill.

“But his overriding strength lay in his ability, whether deliberate

or instinctive I was never quite sure, to combine the incompatible

in the outward simplicity of his approach and in his conviction

that his views were correct, even if they were sometimes

erroneous or untenable. The point is, he knew they were

nevertheless supported by the population and by his own evident

stubborn and dogged determination to put his ideas into effect.”

This kind of leadership is lacking today. The way the current

administration handles the latest discussions on ABM are crucial

to world peace.

Sources: “The American Century,” by Harold Evans

“A History of the American People,” by Paul Johnson

“In Confidence,” by Anatoly Dobrynin.

Brian Trumbore