The Sino-Soviet Clash of 1969

The Sino-Soviet Clash of 1969

While Russia and China are increasingly chummy these days,

that has not always been the case. In fact, going back to the days

of Peter the Great and on through the 1970s and 1980s, the

relationship was often frosty.

In more recent times, the tension started with Stalin who was

uneasy about Mao becoming a potential Asian Tito. But as Mao

was launching his “Make a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign

in 1956, Nikita Khruschev, who had replaced Stalin, was

denouncing Stalin. Khruschev”s criticism was also seen as an

indirect slap at Mao and the Chinese Party.

In Mao”s “Flower” campaign, he had urged the intelligentsia to

speak out boldly against abuses in the bureaucracy or the Party.

Instead of polite criticism, however, it turned into a storm of

protest against the authorities, Communist ideology, and even

Marxism itself. Mao decided, “Never mind,” and promptly had

hundreds of thousands dismissed from their posts and sent to

remote labour camps (where they were to be “reformed”).

The Soviets harshly criticized Mao”s next venture, the “Great

Leap Forward” of 1958 and 1959, as ”adventurism” and

”utopianism.” Mao”s latest campaign was designed to rush China

into a truly ”Communist” society (through higher levels of

collectivization and mass participation in industrial and

agricultural production). The break between the two countries

became final. All aid programmes were cancelled, Soviet

technicians were recalled from China, and Soviet assistance for

China”s nuclear bomb program was suspended as well. [China

finally exploded their first bomb in 1964]. The sudden

withdrawal of economic aid in 1960 came at a particularly

disastrous time as it fell during the catastrophic famine which

followed the Great Leap Forward (when up to 20 million may

have died).

By 1963, there were clashes along the border which would

escalate later on. Meanwhile, in the fall of 1967, Republican

presidential candidate Richard Nixon wrote a piece in “Foreign

Affairs.” “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever

outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies,

cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on

this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people

to live in angry isolation.”

Nixon had noted the signs of rising tension between the U.S.S.R.

and China, particularly in 1968 after the Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia. Soviet Communist Party boss, Leonid

Brezhnev, had initiated a new doctrine bearing his name which

stipulated that the U.S.S.R. reserved the right to intervene in

Communist states in order to preserve international Communism.

The Chinese and many of the Warsaw Pact nations were uneasy.

China feared they could be next. Upon his election in the fall of

1968, Nixon decided to take advantage of this by opening up

overtures to China and thus gaining leverage over the Soviets.

After Nixon”s inauguration in 1969, he sought a new era of

negotiation over one of confrontation with the superpowers.

Nixon thought he could get the Soviets to persuade North

Vietnam to make peace while at the same time he worked the

China angle. If his efforts failed, Nixon was worried that there

was a real possibility of a Sino-Soviet war, one that would most

likely go nuclear.

On March 2, 1969, serious clashes broke out along the Ussuri

River in Siberia which divided the Soviet Union and China. The

Soviets announced that 31 of their soldiers were killed. The

Chinese didn”t release their numbers but the figure was felt to be

high. After this first battle, Soviet diplomats in Washington

supplied detailed briefings of the Soviet version of events.

National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was startled by the

unprecedented openness. The Soviets seemed to be inquiring as

to what the American attitude would be if these clashes

escalated.

America had not indicated a particular concern which, Kissinger

said, “Caused us to ask ourselves whether the briefings might not

be designed to prepare the ground for a full-scale Soviet attack

on China.” The skirmishes seemed to be taking place near major

Soviet supply bases and far from Chinese communications

centers. There was a relentless Soviet buildup along the entire

4,000 mile-length of the border. Kissinger writes in his book

“Diplomacy.”

“The application of the Brezhnev Doctrine to China would mean

that Moscow would try to make the government in Beijing as

submissive as Czechoslovakia”s had been obliged to become the

previous year.” The world”s most populous nation would then be

subordinate to a nuclear superpower – an ominous combination

which would reestablish the dreaded Sino-Soviet bloc of the

1950s.

The Nixon administration had to decide whether the U.S.S.R.

was capable of a full-scale attack on China. Regardless, they

couldn”t risk it, but at the same time, they needed to determine if

the Soviet Union and China were more afraid of each other than

they were of the U.S., which would present a huge opportunity

for the U.S. on the diplomatic front.

On March 15, 1969, the Soviets staged another attack on the

Ussuri River (actually it had never really been established who

fired the first shots on March 2nd). The Chinese refused a call on

March 21, from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. Chinese leader

Chou En-lai later told Nixon that a Chinese “hot-line” operator,

“completely on his own, said to Kosygin, ”You”re a revisionist,

and therefore I will not connect you.”” Kosygin was not amused.

In April, the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

formally turned Beijing”s international policy line somewhat

away from hostility to the U.S. and toward “dual confrontation”

with Moscow and Washington. The Soviets thought the Chinese

were seeking rapprochement with the Americans.

In July, talks on the border dispute were held but the tensions

continued to grow. In June, the Soviets had moved bomber units

into Siberia and Mongolia and practiced attacks on simulated

Chinese nuclear facilities. A Sino-Soviet war involving nukes

seemed inevitable.

In August of 1969, Nixon explained in a NSC meeting that the

Soviets were more aggressive than the Chinese and it would be

contrary to American interests to allow the Chinese to be

“smashed” in a Sino-Soviet war.

In September, the Chinese made a grudging gesture of limited

reconciliation with the Soviets. The death of North Vietnam”s

leader, Ho Chi Minh, was cause for a meeting between Chou En-

lai and Alexei Kosygin in Beijing, the first such encounter in 5

years. But Kosygin was not let out of the airport lounge (as

opposed to Nixon”s red carpet treatment a few years later).

Through diplomatic channels, Nixon now warned the Soviet

Union that the U.S. would not remain indifferent if it were to

attack China. Regardless of China”s attitude toward the U.S.,

Nixon considered China”s independence indispensable to the

global equilibrium, and deemed diplomatic contact with China

essential to the flexibility of American diplomacy. [Back

channel discussions had begun, leading to the eventual opening

to China in 1971-72].

On September 5, 1969, Nixon issued a statement that the U.S.

was “deeply concerned about a Sino-Soviet war.”

“We don”t seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility

between the Soviet Union and the People”s Republic.

Ideological differences between the two Communist giants are

not our affairs. We could not fail to be deeply concerned,

however, with an escalation of this quarrel into a massive breach

of international peace and security.” Nixon, according to

Kissinger, was unique among American presidents in this

century by showing his preparedness to support a country with

which the U.S. had no diplomatic relations for twenty years.

Tensions between the Soviet Union and China did not ease for

years. But after Nixon”s trip to China in 1972, the Soviet Union

faced a challenge by NATO in the West, and China in the East.

Soviet pressures became risky as they threatened to accelerate

the Sino-American rapprochement. Once America had opened to

China, the Soviets best option was to seek its own relaxation

with the U.S. and soon Nixon and Brezhnev were meeting.

It should be noted, though, that relations between Moscow and

Beijing weren”t normalized until 1989.

[For more information on the Nixon / China gambit, you can

check the archives below].

Next week, a special report from Radio Free Europe / Radio

Liberty”s reporter, Paul Goble, on Russian President Vladimir

Putin.

Sources:

“Diplomacy” Henry Kissinger

“In the Arena” Richard Nixon

“One of Us” Tom Wicker

“The Oxford History of the 20th Century” Howard & Louis

“Twentieth Century” J.M. Roberts

Brian Trumbore