NFL Quiz: 1) What three teams have the smallest television
markets? 2) Who are the only two to run for 200 yards in a
game, twice, in 2003? 3) Who am I? I ran for 200 yards, twice,
in 1989 and my initials are G.B. 4) Who rushed for 200 yards a
record six times in his career? Answers below.
Remembering 9/11
[American Airlines Flight 11 / Boston…hit North Tower of the
World Trade Center at 8:46 AM. United Airlines Flight 175 /
Boston …crashes into South Tower of the World Trade Center at
9:03. American Airlines Flight 77 / Dulles…hits Pentagon at
9:38.]
The following account is from the 9/11 Commission Report:
Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami,
Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United
Airlines ticket counter, Newark Airport, for Flight 93 going to
San Francisco. Two checked bags; two did not. Haznawi was
selected by CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System created to identify passengers who should be subject to
special security measures). His checked bag was screened for
explosives and then loaded on the plane.
The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by
United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright
Security. Like the checkpoints in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit
television surveillance so there is no documentary evidence to
indicate when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint, what
alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures
were administered. The FAA interviewed the screeners later;
none recalled anything unusual or suspicious.
The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four
had seats in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-
class section. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami
was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi in 6B.
The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights. They
were planning to hijack these planes and turn them into large
guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By
8:00 AM on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, they
had defeated all the security layers that America’s civil aviation
security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark Liberty
International Airport. The aircraft was piloted by Captain Jason
Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight
attendants. 37 passengers, including the hijackers, boarded
the plane. Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing
757’s takeoff was delayed because of the airport’s typically
heavy morning traffic.
The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at
7:45 (American 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10
(American 77). Three of the flights had actually taken off within
10 to 15 minutes of their planned departure times. United 93
would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes after pulling
away from the gate. When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight
was running more than 25 minutes late.
As United 93 left Newark, the flight’s crew members were
unaware of the hijacking of American 11. Around 9:00, the
FAA, American, and United were facing the staggering
realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would
see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis
managers at the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn
other aircraft. At the same time, Boston Center realized that a
message transmitted just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of
American 11 included the phrase, “We have some planes.”
No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with
multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out
anywhere in the world in more than 30 years, and never in the
United States. As news of the hijackings filtered through the
FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their
leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that
they too might be at risk.
United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness
of that hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77 was
hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline
officials began to comprehend that attackers were going after
multiple aircraft. American Airlines’ nationwide ground stop
between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground
stop. FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the
first two hijackings, requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command
Center “get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for
the cockpit.” There is no evidence that Herndon took such
action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about
other aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry
about a transcontinental flight – Delta 1989 – that in fact was not
hijacked. At 9:19, the FAA’s New England regional office
called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Center advise Delta
1989 to use extra cockpit security.
Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air
carriers’ responsibility to notify their planes of security
problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager said that
it was simply not the FAA’s place to order the airlines what to
tell their pilots. We believe such statements do not reflect an
adequate appreciation of the FAA’s responsibility for the safety
and security of civil aviation.
The airlines bore responsibility, too. They were facing an
escalating number of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous
reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack of vital
information from the FAA about the hijacked flights. We found
no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cockpit
warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United’s first decisive action to
notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come
until 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took
the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16
transcontinental flights: “Beware any cockpit intrusion – Two a/c
(aircraft) hit World Trade Center.” One of the flights that
received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still
responsible for his other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning
message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.”
By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93’s cross-country
trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane
were normal. Heading, speed, and altitude ran according to plan.
At 9:24, Ballinger’s warning to United 93 was received in the
cockpit. Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason Dahl,
responded with a note of puzzlement: “Ed, confirm latest mssg
plz – Jason.”
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet
above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet.
Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA’s air traffic control
center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions
from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first
officer could be heard declaring “Mayday” amid the sounds of a
physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission,
35 seconds later, indicated that the flight was continuing. The
captain or first officer could be heard shouting: “Hey get out of
here – get out of here – get out of here.”
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United
93 – 33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm
for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is
no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or
purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on
9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit
takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however,
the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were
only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out
the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused
entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida’s Orlando
International Airport in August.
Because several passengers on United 93 described three
hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether
one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat
from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by
documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA
personnel. We have found no evidence indicating that one of the
hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the
hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have
used them. We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial
pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and
inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside,
he would not have been visible to the passengers.
At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make
the following announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:
“Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep
remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.” The
flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then
instructed the plane’s autopilot to turn the aircraft around and
head east.
The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most
likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit.
She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise
silenced her.
Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series
of calls from GTE airphones and cellular phones. These calls
between family, friends, and colleagues took place until the end
of the flight and provided those on the ground with firsthand
accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical
information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed
into the World Trade Center.
At 9:39, the FAA’s Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center
overheard a second announcement indicating that there was a
bomb on board, that the plane was returning to the airport, and
that they should remain seated. While it apparently was not
heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on Flight
11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta
earlier, may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he
did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom. To our
knowledge none of them had ever flown an actual airliner before.
At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers
knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care.
It is quite possible Jarrah knew of the success of the assault on
the World Trade Center. He could have learned of this from
messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its
transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit
intrusion and telling of the New York attacks. But even without
them, he would certainly have understood that the attacks on the
World Trade Center would already have unfolded, given Flight
93’s tardy departure from Newark. If Jarrah did know that the
passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred to him
that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York,
thereby defeating his attempts at deception.
At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital
information with family, friends, colleagues, or others on the
ground. All understood the plane had been hijacked. They said
the hijackers wielded knives and claimed to have a bomb. The
hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the
passengers to the back of the aircraft.
Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two
people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead –
possibly the captain and first officer. One caller reported that a
flight attendant had been killed.
One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought
the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers
reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from
the aircraft recounted specifically asking her whether the
hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see
one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was
found at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder
gives no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time.
We believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would
have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the passengers fought
back.
Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers’ claim of
having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of
explosives at the crash sites. One of the passengers who
mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real.
Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle
such illegal items past the security screening checkpoints, we
believe the bombs were probably fake.
During at least five of the passengers’ phone calls, information
was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that
morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the
intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt
against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on
whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane.
They decided, and acted.
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had
terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt.
One of the callers ended her message as follows: “Everyone’s
running up to first class. I’ve got to go. Bye.”
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger
assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family
members who listened to the recording report that they can hear
the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify
whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the
left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At
9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the
door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right,
but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and
pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt the
assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps,
crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates. At 10:00:03,
Jarrah stabilized the airplane.
Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, “Is that it? Shall we finish it
off?” A hijacker responded, “No. Not yet. When they all come,
we finish it off.” The sounds of fighting continued outside the
cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and
down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said, “In the
cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!” Sixteen seconds later, a
passenger yelled, “Roll it!” Jarrah stopped the violent
maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said, “Allah is the greatest!
Allah is the greatest!” He then asked another hijacker in the
cockpit, “Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the
other replied, “Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a
hijacker said, “Pull it down! Pull it down!” The hijackers
remained at the controls but must have judged that the
passengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The
airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the
right. The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers
began shouting “Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest.”
With the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the
aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania,
at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes’ flying time from
Washington, D.C.
Jarrah’s objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the
American Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was
defeated by the alerted, unarmed passengers of United 93.
—
Miscellaneous
–We note the passing of the great Canadian golfer, Mo Norman.
An eccentric sort, he was admired by his contemporaries, both in
Canada (where he won 13 Canadian tour titles) and the U.S., for
being perhaps the best pure ball striker, ever. But he never
sought to play the PGA Tour, outside of one brief stint, and thus
he was anonymous to the golfing public at large, especially with
the recent generation of pros and fans. And for those of you who
have taken up Natural Golf, understand it was Mo Norman who
first came up with this.
–Those calls that went against Serena Williams in her match
with Jennifer Capriatti were unbelievable, but it’s not as if the
Warrior Princess was playing well to begin with.
–The Dodgers’ Robin Ventura hit another grand slam, the 18th of
his career, tying him for 3rd with Willie McCovey on the all-time
list, behind Gehrig (23) and Eddie Murray (19).
–Those amazing New York Mets have now lost 10 in a row as of
Tuesday’s play. What a team…what a future. For starters, I told
you Mike Piazza was washed up, way back last spring, and now
this punch ‘n judy, $15 million a year, overrated ballplayer is
another albatross around the Mets’ necks. No one will take him
off our hands, that’s for sure.
–The Atlanta Braves started the season 39-41. They are 42-14
since.
–Phil Mickelson, at the height of his success, has opted to
change clubs and ball, abandoning Titleist for Callaway and a
new 7-year deal worth a reported $7-$10 million.
–But the following is far more important. Did Tiger split with
Elin Nordegren? Some reports say that’s the case. And look
what I wrote in this space on 12/2/03.
“Congratulations to Tiger Woods for snaring former nanny,
bikini model, and all around bodacious babe, Elin Nordegren. Or
is it the other way around? Don’t expect them to actually get
married, though, until he wins two more majors…that’s the
prediction here.”
Ergo, he didn’t win two majors…now it’s possibly splittsville.
[Of course we’ll find out for sure at the Ryder Cup, where the
wives / girlfriends are prominently on display.]
–And Happy 75th Birthday to Arnold Palmer…9/10.
Top 3 songs for the week of 9/11/71: #1 “Go Away Little Girl”
(Donny Osmond) #2 “Spanish Harlem” (Aretha Franklin) #3
“Smiling Faces Sometimes” (The Undisputed Truth)
NFL Quiz Answers: 1) Smallest television markets. Green Bay
/ Appleton, #68 nationwide, 429,000 households; Jacksonville,
#52, 608,000; Buffalo, #44, 655,500. [New Orleans is #42,
Cincinnati, #32, Kansas City, #31, Nashville, #30. The largest
are New York, #1, 7,542,000; Chicago, #3, 3,449,500; and
Philadelphia, #4, 2,908,000……L.A. is #2, but they don’t have a
team!] 2) LaDainian Tomlinson / San Diego (243, 200) and
Jamal Lewis / Baltimore (295, 205) each ran for 200 yards twice
in 2003. 3) Greg Bell did it twice in 1989 for the L.A. Rams
(210, 221). Bell ran for 4,959 yards in his 7-year career. 4) O.J.
Simpson ran for 200 yards a record six times in his career. No
one did it five times.
Next Bar Chat, Tuesday.
